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Failure detection for aircraft sensor and actuator/actuating-surface systems and flight 
control redistribution in response to failed actuators/surfaces is an important research area.  With 
the advent of faster flight control computers with greater memory available, parallel adaptive 
estimators can now be used to determine sensor and flight control actuator/surface failures.  Since 
most of the sensors are somewhat functionally redundant, when a sensor is lost, the information it 
would have provided could be estimated from other operational sensors using a Kalman Filter.  If 
a flight control actuator or surface fails, then a system having access to all the other flight control 
actuators/surfaces can properly adjust the remaining control actuators/surfaces (i.e., employ 
control redistribution) in order to achieve the commanded maneuver. 
Research has been accomplished in this area using Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation 
(MMAE) to detect failures.  Flight Control Redistribution (CR) is then used to compensate 
automatically for a failed flight control actuator/surface assuming that there is enough control 
authority in the aircraft.  The MMAE is used to detect and identify flight control failures and also 
to provide estimated sensor outputs in the event of a failed sensor.  Further research has been 
accomplished looking at single and multiple failures and MMAE with Filter Spawning (FS) to 
detect complete and partial failures.  Flight control redistribution has also been researched. 
In the current research, the MMAE with Filter Spawning and Control Redistribution 
(MMAE/FS/CR) are used together to identify failures and apply appropriate corrections.  This 
research effort explores the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR in different regions of the flight 
envelope using model and gain scheduling.   
The MMAE/FS/CR is able to detect complete and partial actuator/surface failures as well 
as complete sensor failures.  Once the actuator/surface failure is identified and the effectiveness is 
determined, proper control is applied in order to accomplish the desired pilot command.  
 xix
Improvements in the algorithm are required in order to enhance the MMAE/FS/CR ability to 
detect failures while undergoing maneuvering flight. 
This research effort shows the ability of the MMAE/FS to detect failures while 
transitioning through the flight envelope and while performing pilot commanded maneuvers.  
This research also improved and demonstrated the CR ability to compensate for complete or 
partial actuator/surface failures. 
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Flight Control Failure Detection and Redistribution Using Multiple 
Model Adaptive Estimation With Filter Spawning 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This thesis presents a flight control failure detection and control redistribution method 
using multiple model adaptive estimation [27,28] with filter spawning [11,12], combined with a 
flight control redistribution network [32,33] to respond appropriately to detected flight control 
actuator/actuating-surface failures.  This thesis will show the capability of detecting complete and 
partial failures of flight control actuators/surfaces and aircraft sensors and the application of the 
proper control based on the commanded maneuver anywhere in the Variable In-flight Stability 
Test Aircraft (VISTA) F-16 flight envelope.  This chapter presents the motivation behind this 
thesis and defines the problem.  A summary of assumptions made for this thesis effort is also 
presented in this chapter.  Finally, this chapter describes the general format of the remainder of 
the thesis document. 
1.2 Motivation 
 
The United States Air Force recognizes the requirement of a flight control system that is 
tolerant of failures in both flight control actuators/surfaces and sensors.  The flight control system 
should be able to detect partial and complete failures in both the flight control actuators/surfaces 
and sensors.  Upon discovery of a failed surface or sensor, the flight control system should adapt 
to the available operational surfaces and adjust the flight control commands accordingly to 
accomplish the commanded aircraft maneuver through unfailed actuators/surfaces.  This is 
especially important to Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in which there is no pilot aboard the 
aircraft to determine flight control problems and apply the appropriate corrections.  This is also 
critical to pilot-operated vehicles since this failure detection and control system operates without 
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the need for pilot interaction and, when required, can minimize the pilot workload by 
automatically compensating for the failed actuator or sensor. 
Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation with Filter Spawning and Control Redistribution 
(MMAE/FS/CR) is chosen because of its capability to detect sensor and flight control failures 
rapidly and correctly, make estimations using all information available, and supply appropriate 
corrective control performance in the face of a partial or complete actuator/surface failure.  The 
Filter Spawning (FS) algorithm introduces additional filters based on partial failure assumptions, 
once a specific actuator/surface has been identified as having suffered some level of failure, in 
order to identify the effectiveness of the partially failed actuator/surface.  The FS portion of the 
MMAE/FS/CR has been shown to identify partial and complete actuator/surface failures, and 
single and dual failures correctly.  By using the FS algorithm, the percentage of actuator/surface 
effectiveness is determined.  This knowledge can assist in the decision making process whether to 
increase the command signal gain to a surface or to redistribute the command signal.  The 
knowledge of the failure source is supplied by the MMAE and FS supplies the percentage of 
effectiveness of the failed system.   Control commands from the flight control system are then 
increased in gain or redistributed to the remaining operational actuators/surfaces in order to 
accomplish the commanded maneuver in any position in the flight envelope.  The flight envelope 
is a region defined by dynamic pressure.  The aircraft’s linearized equations of motion used in the 
MMAE/FS/CR are based on subsets of the flight envelope.  As the aircraft changes airspeed or 
altitude, the dynamic pressure changes.  A flight control failure detection and control system must 
operate properly over the entire flight envelope.  This is typically done with flight control gains 
for specific regions of the flight envelope based on the aircraft’s location within the flight 
envelope.  This method is called gain scheduling.  Model scheduling is similar to gain scheduling 
except the parameters for the MMAE are used based on the aircraft’s location within the flight 
envelope.  It has been shown that model scheduling is essential to demonstrate the MMAE/FS/CR 
performance completely [9,10].  If model scheduling is not used, after a few seconds of 
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maneuvering flight, all the models within the MMAE’s elemental filters become mismatched, 
incapacitating the MMAE’s adaptation.   
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
A great deal of research into the detection and estimation of single and dual, partial and 
complete, flight control actuator/surface and complete sensor failures has been accomplished on 
the VISTA F-16 simulation [7,9-12,17,27,28,32,33].  Adequate detection performance has been 
achieved in the determination of partial and complete, single and dual failures at one point in the 
flight envelope.  This research intends to demonstrate the capability of the MMAE/FS/CR to 
detect single, partial and complete, flight control actuator/surface and complete sensor failures in 
various regions of the flight envelope and with full vehicle maneuvering. 
1.4 Assumptions 
 
The VISTA F-16 is used to provide the “real world” data for this research.  The VISTA 
F-16 Simulation Rapid-prototyping Facility (SRF) is a six-degree-of-freedom simulation tool 
developed by Calspan and General Dynamics [11].  The VISTA F-16 simulation provides the 
“truth model”, and it is assumed that the outputs of the simulation are characteristic of the VISTA 
F-16 test aircraft. 
The flight control failure modes used in this research are “failure to free stream”, 
meaning a failed flight control surface does not contribute to the maneuvering of the aircraft.  
This failure mode is used in the “truth model” and the “design model” and is characteristic of 
flight control failures encountered in the “real world”. 
1.5 Thesis Format 
 
This thesis is divided into six chapters.  This first chapter provides an introduction and 
problem definition.  Chapter two presents the history, theory, and modifications of MMAE/CR 
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with filter spawning for online implementation.  Chapter three presents the “truth model” and the 
construction of the “design model”.  Chapter four presents MMAE/FS as it is used for this 
research.  Chapter four also presents the design for a MMAC controller and the CR algorithm.  
Chapter five presents the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR given single, partial and complete, 
flight control actuator/surface failures and complete sensor failures at different regions of the 
flight envelope and different degrees of maneuvering.  Chapter six reviews the initial problem 




Chapter 2 – Concept Development 
 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
 
In this chapter, the Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation using Filter Spawning and 
Control Redistribution (MMAE/FS/CR) concepts are covered in detail.  This chapter is broken 
into two sections; the first deals with the MMAE with Filter Spawning (MMAE/FS) and the 
second deals with the CR.  Each section provides an overview of the history, the theory, and 
practical implementation.  This layout presents the material so that the reader may clearly 
understand the ideas and theory while also understanding the historical buildup of the theory and 
implementation. 
2.2 Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation and Control History 
 
 
2.2.1 Early Contributions 
 
The MMAE was first introduced in 1965 by Magill [20].  Magill proposed the use of 
several elemental filters based on different hypotheses of ‘real world’ characteristics.  The 
estimates of each elemental filter are weighted and summed together based on the conditional 
probability assigned to each elemental filter to form a blended estimate.  The elemental 
conditional probability is the probability that a certain elemental filter is correct, conditioned on 
the observed measurements.  Lainiotis first presented the concept of Multiple Model Adaptive 
Control (MMAC) in 1973 [15].  This algorithm is similar to the MMAE except elemental 
controllers are cascaded with the elemental filters.  The elemental control commands are then 
weighted by the conditional probabilities and then summed together to form blended control 
commands.  These ideas only existed in theory at this time because they required extensive 
computing power to carry out the parallel operations of the elemental filters and controllers.  The 
MMAE and MMAC also suffered from algorithm problems that drove the conditional probability 
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of certain elemental filters to zero, making the MMAE/MMAC insensitive to later environmental 
changes. 
In 1978, Chang and Athans [6] researched the optimality of the MMAE.  They found the 
MMAE is only optimal if the ‘real world’ parameter space exactly matched the parameter space 
of the elemental filters.  Since this condition requires an infinite amount of elemental filters, the 
MMAE is suboptimal for estimation.  Baram [2, 3, 4] showed that, for discretized spaces, the 
MMAE would converge (under specific assumptions) to the one discrete parameter value that is 
closest to the true parameter value in the “Baram distance measure” sense.  Tugnait [35] also 
showed the suboptimal performance of the MMAE with Markov-1 processes.  Fry and Sage [13] 
investigated the used of a hierarchical structure in order to reduce the computational loading of 
the MMAE.   
 
2.2.2 Early Implementation 
 
In 1977, Athans et al. [1] presented the first practical application of MMAC with aircraft.  
The MMAE/MMAC is used to determine the flight condition of a fly-by-wire F-8C aircraft.  Two 
algorithm enhancements with the MMAC were identified in this research effort.  The first is the 
application of a probability lower bound.  In the MMAC, some of the elemental conditional 
probabilities went to zero, making the MMAC insensitive to later changes involving those 
particular elemental filters.  A probability lower bound was applied that causes the conditional 
probability to be a non-zero number at all times, thereby precluding this “lockout” phenomenon.  
The second enhancement used in this research is using a weighted average, or Bayesian method, 
to form the control signal for the MMAC.  This is used instead of selecting the single elemental 
controller with the highest conditional probability and ignoring the rest of the control signals 
(Maximum A Posteriori, or MAP, method).  Two problems with the MMAE were found in this 
research.  The first problem is Beta Dominance and the second is the requirement of a dither 
signal, both of which will be explained in detail later in this chapter.  This research showed the 
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implementation of MMAE and MMAC, but the aircraft selected for this research was inherently 
stable.  This makes the advanced control not noteworthy and the flight control system did not 
allow the full implementation of the MMAE/MMAC. 
 
2.2.3 AFIT Contributions 
 
The Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) has made several advancements in the 
implementation of MMAE and MMAC for the detection of flight control failures and control of 
aircraft with failures.  The use of the MMAE algorithm has been explored by AFIT in order to 
detect sensor and flight control actuator/surface failures on current fighter aircraft.  The MMAE 
has been implemented on digital simulations of the Short-field Take-Off and Landing (STOL) F-
15 test aircraft [24,26,31,34], unmanned aerial vehicles [14,16], and the VISTA F-16 [7,9-12, 
17,27,28,32,33].  The research started with the detection of single full failures and currently 
includes exploration into detection of single and dual sensor failures and partial and complete 
flight control actuator/surface failures.   
In 1985, Maybeck and Suizu first explored the Beta Dominance problem with the MMAE 
(for a different application).  Beta Dominance can cause false declarations, as will be explained 
later in the thesis.  Through their research, it was found that removing the Beta term increases the 
reliability of the MMAE by reducing the amount of false declarations on sensor failures without 
negatively affecting the MMAE estimates.   
Maybeck and Hentz also explored the moving filter bank concept at AFIT in 1987 [25].  
The use of a hierarchical structure was also explored [11,12]. 
AFIT made several contributions to flight control failure detection using the 
MMAE/MMAC.  Pogoda conducted the first implementation of MMAC to detect sensor and 
flight control failures on the STOL F-15 in 1988 [24,31].  In 1989, Stevens [26,34] used the 
MMAC with and without the Beta term removed to detect complete sensor and flight control 
actuator failures on the STOL F-15.  He combined the elemental filter estimates using the 
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Bayesian method.  Stevens also investigated scalar residual monitoring and in 1993, Menke [27, 
28] continued this research using the VISTA F-16 using MMAE-based control rather than the 
previously explored MMAC control.  Menke also used the full flight control system of the 
VISTA F-16 as compared to previous research conducted with only the longitudinal channel of 
the STOL F-15.  Menke used the Dryden wind model researched by Pogoda for the F-16 VISTA 
aircraft in a low dynamic pressure (0.4 Mach and 20,000 feet) environment.  This environment 
was chosen because sensor and flight control failures are hardest to detect in this region of the 
flight envelope.  Many types of sensor failures were tested by Menke, such as loss of signal, 
increased noise, and bias.  From this research effort, it was found that a dither signal is required in 
order to detect some failures unambiguously in the absence of pilot commands. 
Eide [9,10] first implemented the MMAE on the six-degree-of-freedom VISTA F-16 SRF 
simulation in 1994.  The SRF is a simulation that includes the nonlinear dynamics of the 
longitudinal and lateral/directional channels.  The simulation includes the complete F-16 Block 
40 Flight Control System (FCS) which includes the aileron-rudder interconnect.  The simulation 
tool also includes the capability to observe sensor data and flight control actuator commands and 
also allows the direct command of the flight control actuators.  This is essential for detecting 
failures and applying appropriate control.  Eide discovered that a MMAE equipped with models 
based on one location within the flight envelope are valid for only a small neighborhood about 
that point in the flight envelope, before all elemental filters look wrong, incapacitating the 
adaptation mechanism of the MMAE.  This drives the requirement for model scheduling based on 
the dynamic pressure for any investigation of substantial aircraft maneuvering, as is the intent of 
this research. 
Stepaniak [32,33] attempted to apply the first MMAC controller to the SRF VISTA F-16 
in 1995.  Stepaniak explored the use of Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) synthesis in order to 
design the elemental controllers within the MMAC.  The design intention was to replicate the 
Block 40 flight control system used by the VISTA F-16 via LQG CGI/PI (Command Generator 
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Tracking with Proportional plus Integral) synthesis.  The resulting weighting matrices would have 
then been used to design the LQG elemental controllers to handle the conditions of a failed sensor 
or actuator/surface.  He found that the Block 40 FCS could not be adequately reproduced using 
LQG synthesis methods.  Stepaniak then designed a single controller that redistributes the Block 
40 flight control system actuator control commands to the appropriate unfailed actuators based on 
the estimates and failure status provided by the MMAE.  This method is called Control 
Redistribution (CR).  He refined the required dither signal and also completely demonstrated the 
MMAE’s capability to detect and compensate for complete failures of any sensor or flight control 
actuator/surface. 
In 1996, Lewis [17] researched the use of a redistributed dither signal upon declaration of 
a failed flight control actuator/surface.  He also demonstrated the MMAE’s capability of detecting 
single and dual complete failures of any sensor or flight control actuator/surface combinations.  
Clark [7] researched the detection of partial failures in 1997.  He blended the estimates of 
elemental filters based on the hypothesis of a fully functional aircraft and a completely failed 
flight control actuator in order to handle partially failed actuators.  The inability of this approach 
to identify properly the percentage of effectiveness of partially failed filters motivated the idea of 
the FS algorithm.  
Fisher [11, 12] developed the concept of filter spawning in 1999.  This method uses an 
initial set of elemental filters to detect a sensor or flight control actuator/surface failure (assigning 
only “fully functional aircraft” and “fully failed sensor or actuator” hypotheses).  Once an 
actuator/surface failure is detected, several more elemental filters are brought online or spawned.  
Each of the spawned filter models is based on different assumed values of flight control actuator 
effectiveness percentage.  By using this approach, Fisher demonstrated the MMAE’s capability to 
detect single failures and also determine the effectiveness of a partially failed flight control 
actuator/surface.  The current research seeks to combine the performance of the MMAE with 
filter spawning as developed by Fisher, with the CR developed by Stepaniak.  The current 
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research then seeks to prove the effectiveness of this combination in various locations within the 
flight envelope of the VISTA F-16.  Different levels of maneuvering are also examined in this 
research, using model and gain scheduling to handle the effects of maneuver commands causing 
the aircraft to transverse a path of points through the flight envelope. 
2.3 MMAE Theory 
 
The MMAE is a structure made of several Kalman filters operating in parallel used to 
provide an estimate given a substantially varying ‘real world’:  a ‘real world’ described by 
parameter values or hypothesized conditions that can vary over a range of possible values.  The 
structure of the MMAE is discussed in Section 2.3.1.  The Kalman filter provides an optimal state 
estimate based on the ‘real world’ inputs and measurements, and the Kalman filter’s internal 
model, and this is discussed in detail in Section 2.3.2.  The conditional probability generator 
computes the relative probability of the correctness of each elemental filter at the current time, 
conditioned on the measurements observed from the ‘real world’.  The conditional probability 
generator is discussed in Section 2.3.3.  Section 2.3.4 shows that the MMAE is guaranteed to 
converge onto one of the hypotheses under certain conditions, and Section 2.3.5 discusses the 
formulation of the state estimate from the MMAE.  The hierarchical structure used for handling 
multiple failures without impractical computational burden is shown in Section 2.3.6, and filter 
spawning for addressing partial actuator/surface failures is explained in detail in Section 2.3.7. 
 
2.3.1 Multiple Hypothesis Models 
 
The MMAE is based upon multiple hypothesis models.  MMAE is effective in a ‘real 
world’ that has changing parameters.  If only one filter is used in this case, the Kalman filter state 
estimates would contain large errors since the linearized model is valid for one set of parameters.  
The MMAE uses several Kalman filters in parallel, each with a model corresponding to a 
different ‘real world’ hypothesis.  When the conditions of the ‘real world’ change, such as a flight 
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control actuator/surface failure, the fully functional aircraft hypothesis becomes invalid, while the 
appropriate hypothesis postulating the flight control actuator/surface failure becomes correct.  
The part of the MMAE that makes the determination of relative model adequacy is the 
conditional probability generator.  By examining the residuals of each of the elemental filters and 
the expected covariance of the residual vector, the probability that an elemental filter is currently 
correct can be determined.  The conditional probability is used as a multiplication factor for each 
elemental filter estimate and then the weighted estimates are summed together to form one 
MMAE estimate in a Bayesian (conditional mean estimation) approach.  Alternatively, a 
Maximum A Priori (MAP) approach (computing a conditional mode instead) can be applied to 
the MMAE by using only the estimate from the elemental filter with the highest computed 
conditional probability.  The individual components of the MMAE are described in detail in the 










2.3.2 Kalman Filter 
 
The Kalman filter is an optimal recursive state estimator for a dynamic system adequately 
represented as a linear system driven by white Gaussian noises.  The Kalman filter has two 
stages.  The first stage is the propagate stage.  This is where a mathematical model is used in the 
Kalman filter to compute a predicted state estimate.  The predicted state error covariance is then 
calculated based on the covariance of the previous state estimate (right after the most recent 
measurement) and the assumed characteristics of the dynamics driving noise in the model.  The 
second stage of the Kalman filter is the update stage.  The Kalman gain is calculated using the 
predicted state estimate error covariance and the measurement noise covariance.  The Kalman 
gain is used to weigh the incoming measurement and the predicted state estimate, to form an 
optimal updated state estimate.  The Kalman gain is then used to update the error covariance of 
the filter state estimate as well. 
The model used in the Kalman filter is linear.  The discrete-time form of the filter design 
model is [22] 
                  x(ti+1) = Φ(ti+1,ti) x(ti) + Bd(ti) u(ti) + Gd(ti) wd(ti)   (2.1) 
z(ti) = H(ti) x(ti) + v(ti)     (2.2) 
 where Φ(ti+1,ti) is the discrete-time linear model state transition matrix used to propagate the 
state estimate, x(ti), from one sample time to the next.  Bd(ti) is the control matrix that relates the 
input control vector, u(ti), to the state vector.  Gd(ti) is the matrix that relates the dynamic driving 
noise, wd(ti), to the state vector. H(ti) is the discrete-time matrix that relates the state vector to the 
measurement vector, z(ti), and v(ti) is the measurement corruption noise.  The statistics of the 
white Gaussian noises are 
E[wd(ti)] = 0   E[wd(ti)wdT(tj)] = Qdδij    
E[v (ti)] = 0      E[v(ti)vT(tj)] = Rδij   (2.3) 




The algorithm used for the propagation of the Kalman filter forward in time is 
x^(ti+1–) = Φ(ti+1,ti)x^(ti+) + Bd(ti)u(ti)     (2.4) 
 
P(ti+1–) = Φ(ti+1,ti)P(ti+)Φ T(ti+1,ti) + Gd(ti)Qd(ti)GdT(ti)   (2.5) 
and the algorithm used for the measurement update of the Kalman filter is 
A(ti)  =  H(ti)P(ti–)H(ti)T + R(ti)      (2.6) 
 
K(ti) = P(ti-)H(ti)TA-1(ti)       (2.7) 
 
r(ti) = zi - H(ti)x^(ti–)       (2.8) 
 
x^(ti+) = x^(ti–) + K(ti) r(ti)      (2.9) 
 
P(ti+) = P(ti–) - K(ti)H(ti)P(ti–)      (2.10) 
The superscripts – and + indicate the value before and after the time the measurement is taken, 
respectively.  The Kalman filter gain K(ti) is calculated using the previous covariance matrix   
P(ti-) the measurement matrix H(ti) and the measurement noise covariance matrix R(ti).  The r(ti) 
is the residual vector and is the difference between the measurement at the current time and the 
predicted measurement using the measurement matrix and the predicted state vector x^(ti–).  The 
Kalman filter gain is then used to update the state estimate and the state error covariance. 
The residual vector is zero-mean and well described by the precomputed residual 
covariance A(ti), as long as the linear model used in the Kalman filter is valid.  If the ‘real world’ 
differs substantially from the linear model used in the Kalman filter, a bias or increased 
magnitude will appear in the residuals and the residual values will be larger than anticipated by 
the precomputed residual variance.  Another way to describe this is, if the value of                
[r(ti)T A(ti)-1 r(ti)] is approximately equal to the number of measurements, then the hypothesis of 
the linear model is correct.  If this value is much greater than the number of measurements, then 
the hypothesis model is incorrect. 
The Kalman filter provides an optimal state estimate x^(ti+), and a filter-computed state 
covariance P(ti+) given a measurement history up through time ti.  The Kalman filter also provides 
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a residual vector and a filter-computed residual covariance which are required to use the MMAE 
algorithm. 
 
2.3.3 Conditional Probability Generator 
 
The conditional probability generator determines the conditional probability of each 
elemental filter’s estimates being correct.  Each elemental Kalman filter provides a residual 
vector, rk(ti), and a residual covariance vector, Ak(ti), where the k subscript corresponds to kth 
elemental Kalman filter.  Residual monitoring is inherent in the algorithm: real-time residuals are 
used to determine the correct hypothesis.   
The conditional probability that the kth elemental filter matches the ‘real world’, 
conditioned on the measurement history, Zi, is shown as 
pk(ti)  =  prob{a=ak | Z(ti)=Zi}     (2.11) 
The conditional probability computation has been shown to be computable as [22] 
     fz(ti)|a,Z(ti-1)(zi | ak, Zi-1) · pk(ti-1) 
pk(ti)  =  __________________________________________   (2.12) 
                      ∑
j=1
K
  fz(ti)|a,Z(ti-1)(zi | aj, Zi-1) · pj(ti-1) 
where the numerator is the density function of the measurement conditioned on the assumed 
parameter value or elemental filter being correct and on the entire observed measurement history, 
multiplied by the previously computed conditional probability for the elemental filter.  The 
denominator is a scaling factor used to make the conditional probabilities for all of the elemental 
filters sum to one; it is simply the sum of all possible numerator terms.  The density function 
above is defined as 
    fz(ti)|a,Z(ti-1)(zi | ak, Zi-1)  =  
1
(2π)m/2 |Ak(ti)|1/2
  exp{·}   (2.13) 
 






where the ‘beta term’ is 
 
   βk(ti) = 
1
(2π)m/2 |Ak(ti)|1/2
       (2.14)  
 
 
and the likelihood quotient is 
 
   Lk(ti) = rkT(ti)Ak-1(ti)rk(ti)    (2.15) 
 
By using the equations shown above, the conditional density of the elemental filter k can 
be determined at time ti by using the previous elemental conditional density and the rk(ti) and 
Ak(ti) calculated by the elemental Kalman filter.  If the ‘real world’ parameters closely resemble 
those of a certain elemental filter, then the residuals will be zero-mean and the covariance of the 
residuals will closely resemble the calculated residual covariance.  In this case, the likelihood 
quotient will approach the dimension of the measurement vector, z(ti).  As the elemental filter 
becomes mismatched with the ‘real world’, the residuals will no longer be zero-mean and the 
covariance of the residuals will be substantially larger than the computed residual covariance.  
The likelihood quotient also shows this variation by becoming larger than the value of the 
dimension of the measurement vector. 
 
2.3.4 MMAE Convergence 
 
The convergence of the MMAE to the correct filter has been researched [2-4].  The 
MMAE has been shown always to converge to the correct filter assuming an elemental filter 
exactly matches the ‘real world’ [2-4].  In the case in which the ‘real world’ does not exactly 
match any of the elemental filter hypotheses, the hypothesis that most closely matches the ‘real 
world’ characteristics in a Baram distance sense will have the highest conditional probability [2-
4].  These proofs can guarantee the convergence of the MMAE to a hypothesis but they cannot 
guarantee the speed at which the MMAE will converge to the hypothesis.  It has been shown in 
previous research [11, 12] that, in the case of aircraft actuator/surface and sensor failure 
detection, the MMAE converges in a reasonable time (on the order of seconds or less).  
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2.3.5 MMAE State Estimate 
 
There are two methods by which a state estimate can be made by the MMAE.  The first 
method is the Bayesian method and the second is the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) method.  
The Bayesian method uses the condition probability computed by the MMAE to weight the 
elemental state estimates from the elemental Kalman filters.  The weighted estimates are then 
summed together, or blended, to form one estimate (a conditional mean estimate) that contains 
information from each of the elemental filters.  The MAP method uses only the elemental state 
estimate of the hypothesis with the highest conditional probability (a conditional mode estimate).  
The other elemental state estimates are disregarded and the MMAE output only contains the 
information from the single elemental Kalman filter.  
The MAP method can be useful when the MMAE is used in a large parameter space.  The 
MAP method eliminates the estimates that contain large errors due to mismatched filters by only 
using the estimates from the filter that closely matches the ‘real world’.  The Bayesian method is 
useful for a parameter space in which the elemental filter models are similar or contain similar 
information.  One particularly useful application is to attempt to handle partial actuator/surface 
failures by blending the estimates of a filter based on the hypothesis of a fully functional aircraft 
with the estimates of a filter that assumes a fully failed actuator/surface.  This allows a coarser 
discretization of the parameter space than does the MAP form of the MMAE.  A mismatched 
filter can still contribute to the estimate and decrease the MMAE accuracy.  In this research, the 
state estimates will be blended together using the Bayesian method. 
 
2.3.6 Hierarchical Structure 
 
The MMAE is based on a hypothesized set of system parameter vector values.  In the 
case of detecting aircraft failures, the system parameter vector values are a representation of the 
failure status condition of the aircraft.  If only single failures are considered, only 12 elemental 
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filters would be required (one fully functional aircraft filter, five fully failed flight control 
actuator/surface filters and six total sensor failure filters): 
  A = {a1, a2, … , aK} = {a1, a2, …, a12} 
If it is desired to estimate single and dual failures, then 67 filters would be required to run in 
parallel in order to detect all possible combinations of failures.  Each filter would have to be 
propagated and updated and the conditional probability for each filter would have to be calculated 
in order to produce a state estimate from the MMAE.  This can become computationally very 
burdensome. 
In order to solve this computation problem, the failure sets can be broken up into a 
hierarchical set of banks.  Initially, only 12 filters will be computed online for the detection of a 
single failure.   
  A0 = {a0, a1, … , aK} 
Once a failure is detected, a second bank of filters is brought online, one of: 
  A1 = {a0, a1, a12, … , a1K} 
   A2 = {a0, a2, a21, … , a2K} 
               
   AK = {a0, aK, aK1, … , aK,K-1} 
The second bank of filters is based on the first failure, once it is declared with assurance, and this 
second bank is used to detect a second failure.  This reduces the computational burden by only 
requiring a maximum of 12 filters running in parallel.  The 12 filters are the original 11 failure 
detection filters but each with the additional assumption of the first failure already having been 
declared, and the 12th filter allows the algorithm to reverse back to a fully functional aircraft, a0, if 
a false failure declaration had actually occurred.  The hierarchical structure is shown in Figure 2 
on the next page.  The hierarchical structure as presented here is used for the detection of single 
and dual failures without the requirement running a large number of filters in parallel based on 
every possible failure combination.  
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2.3.7 Filter Spawning 
 
Filter Spawning (FS) is a method used to determine the percent of effectiveness (i.e., 
100% minus the percentage of failure) of a failed flight control actuator/surface.  It has been 
shown [11,12] to provide adequate estimations of the flight controls actuator/surface effectiveness 
once a failure is declared by the MMAE.  Once a specific flight control actuator/surface failure is 
declared, several online filters are spawned.  Each filter is based on a specific effectiveness of that 
particular flight control actuator/surface.  By observing the elemental probabilities in the spawned 
filters and the fully failed filter, a blended estimate of the effectiveness for a failed flight control 
actuator/surface is determined.  This algorithm can be used in conjunction with the hierarchical 
structure since the hierarchical structure is used to detect failures in individual sensor and flight 
control actuators/surfaces and the filter spawning algorithm is used to evaluate the effectiveness 
of a single flight control actuator/surface once a failure declaration is made. 
2.4 MMAE in Practice 
 
2.4.1 Probability Lower Bounds 
 
One problem encountered with the original design of the MMAE is the MMAE’s 
convergence to one hypothesis and the condition of all the conditional probabilities of the other 
hypotheses going to zero over time.  Since the previous elemental conditional probability is used 
to compute the current elemental condition probability (Equation (2.12)), once the elemental 
conditional probability equals zero, it will remain zero for all time thereafter.  This locks the 
MMAE onto a single hypothesis even though the ‘real world’ may be changing.  It has been 
found that setting a lower limit to the elemental conditional probabilities solves this problem [1, 
22].  The probability lower bound ensures that an elemental conditional probability will always 
be greater than zero. 
Setting the probability lower bound is also challenging.  Setting the probability lower 
bound too low will cause the MMAE to react slowly to changes in the ‘real world’, while a high 
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probability lower bound can cause the MMAE state estimate to contain a heavily weighted 
estimate from a mismatched elemental filter, thereby corrupting the MMAE output.   
When the Bayesian blending method is used to create estimates, the incorrect estimate 
from a mismatched filter is still combined with the estimate from the matched filter.  This can 
result in substantial estimate errors from the MMAE.  An alternative approach has been used to 
solve this problem.  This approach is the modified Bayesian method.  In this method, the 
elemental conditional probabilities are examined, and when a conditional probability is equal to 
(or very close to) the probability lower bound, that estimate is removed from the estimation 
blending used to determine the state estimate and estimate of effectiveness.  This means that only 
the filter estimates with a relatively high conditional probability will be allowed to blend to form 
the MMAE estimate, without the corrupt estimates from mismatched filters.  This allows useful 
blending but precludes corruption of the state estimates solely because of imposing the artificial 
lower bound. 
 
2.4.2 Beta Dominance 
 
There has been much research in the area of Beta dominance [1,26-28,34].  Beta 
dominance is the condition in which the conditional probabilities are incorrectly calculated due to 
the Beta term in the previous equations (Equation (2.14)) when the likelihood quotients (Equation 
(2.15)) of all (or many) elemental filters are essentially the same.  An example of this is that 
failed sensor hypotheses yield low computed residual covariances, which in turn yields to a 
tendency to declare false alarms on sensors because the associated likelihood quotient      
[rkT(ti)Ak-1(ti)rk(ti)] can readily become large due to small Ak values.  One solution to this problem 
is the complete removal of the Beta term from the conditional probability equations [11,12].  By 
taking this step, Equation (2.13) no longer yields a proper Gaussian density function since the 
area under the function no longer equals to unity.  This is not a great concern since the 
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denominator in Equation (2.12) scales the conditional probability so the summation of all 
conditional probabilities will always equal one. 
 
2.4.3 Dither Signal 
 
A dither signal is required in order to detect some failures unambiguously in the absence 
of pilot commands.  A low magnitude (subliminal) control signal must be introduced into the 
flight control actuators in order to excite the aircraft sufficiently to detect failures properly while 
not exciting it so much as to be objectionable to the pilot.  Without the dither signal, there does 
not exist enough observability to detect and disambiguate certain failure modes.  For example, if 
the rudder fails on an aircraft and the pilot is flying straight and level, the failed rudder will only 
be noticed the first time the pilot requires the rudder.  A dither signal would be used to excite the 
rudder and the rudder failure would be noticed well before the pilot applied a control input.  This 
allows the MMAE to detect the failures and the controller to apply corrective control in lieu of 
pilot commands. 
Various types of dither signals have been introduced [9,10] but only the sinusoidal dither 
signal provides the best performance with respect to failure detection.  The frequency of the 
sinusoidal dither signal is known and is used to determine failures.  Once a surface has failed, the 
sinusoidal dither signal contributed by that particular surface will not appear.  This lack of signal 
is detected by the residuals of the various elemental filters and the residuals of the elemental filter 
that correctly hypothesizes the actual failure will look substantially different from the residuals of 
all the other elemental filters.  The MMAE algorithm is then more capable of determining flight 
control actuator/surface failures.  Different dither frequencies can also be used for each flight 
control surface and by detecting the frequencies through the aircraft sensors, any failed flight 
control actuator can be determined since its frequency will not be detected by the sensors. 
The use of a dither signal must be well planned since the pilot will detect any additional 
movement in the flight control surfaces.  The use of too large of a dither signal disturbs the pilot 
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and a dither signal too small results in missed failure declarations.  The dither is only required in 
the absence of pilot command inputs.  Other methods can be used instead of a constant dither 
signal, such as using a (pilot-commanded) short-term, large magnitude maneuver during times of 
steady flight.  The pilot-commanded maneuver does not have the subliminal requirement as does 
the dither signal.  This means the pilot-commanded maneuver can be a large enough magnitude to 
allow the MMAE/FS to provide better detection performance compared to the subliminal dither 
signal.  The dither signal used in this research is a sinusoidal dither with a frequency of 15 Hz and 
+/- 0.1 g’s in the longitudinal channel and +/- 0.2 g’s in the lateral channel.  These dither 
parameters have been used in previous research efforts and are not truly subliminal to a pilot, but 
have been found tolerable to pilots in research conducted in the 1960’s.   
 
2.4.4 Model Scheduling 
 
This research presents the application of model scheduling based on the dynamic 
pressure.  Dynamic pressure is the distribution of force exerted on a control surface by the 
airflow, and this is dependent on the airspeed of the aircraft and the air density, which changes 
with altitude.  Previous research efforts have explored the operation of the MMAE/FS and CR at 
only one dynamic pressure point (Mach 0.4 and 20,000 feet).  The parameters of the linear 
models used in the elemental filters are dependent on the dynamic pressure.  In order to allow the 
aircraft to change airspeed and altitude and still maintain detection and estimation performance 
by the MMAE/FS, stability derivatives and other parameters in the elemental linear filters used in 
the MMAE/FS are evaluated as a function of dynamic pressure (airspeed and altitude).  This is 
called ‘model scheduling’ and is applied to the MMAE/FS algorithm in this research effort to 
allow the aircraft to transition the flight envelope (an area comprised of all dynamic pressures 
where the aircraft is able to fly) due to purposeful pilot commanded maneuvers. 
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2.5 Control Redistribution in Theory 
 
Two forms of adaptive control are shown in this chapter.  The first adaptive controller 
discussed is the Multiple Model Adaptive Controller (MMAC).  This controller is discussed in 
Section 2.5.1.  The MMAC is made up of parallel controllers, and the LQG synthesis of these 
controllers is shown in Section 2.5.2.  Finally, an alternative approach called Control 
Redistribution (CR) is discussed in Section 2.5.3. 
 
2.5.1 MMAC Description 
 
The MMAC is built on an MMAE foundation.  In a MMAC, there is an elemental 
controller for each hypothesis (assumed parameter value) of the MMAE.  Each elemental 
controller uses the state estimates formed by the corresponding elemental filter to produce a 
control signal based on the assumed hypothesis of the ‘real world’.  The control signals are then 
blended together using the conditional probabilities as weighting factors.  The MMAE filters are 
the same as described earlier in this chapter and the operation of the conditional probability 
generator is also the same as in the MMAE.  The structure of the MMAC is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: MMAC Structure [23] 
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2.5.2 LQG Synthesis 
 
The MMAC controllers are designed using the Linear Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) 
synthesis.  This method allows the designer to build a controller and adjust the performance of the 
controller by adjusting the quadratic cost function in the controller design.  The general cost 
function is shown in Equation (2.16) [23]: 





















1 xXxuUuxXx   (2.16) 
 
The quadratic cost function penalizes the controller for applying too much control and for not 
following the reference input signal closely enough through the U(ti) and X(ti) weighting 
matrices.  Typically, in flight control problems, the final term representing the cost for not getting 
to a particular final state, Xf, is dropped, and N → ∞ to allow for steady-state constant-gain 
controller design.  For example, the cost function can be based on the amount of control applied 
and the ability of the controller to use the surfaces to perform a given command.  By adjusting the 
cost function, the controller can be designed to perform a command perfectly at the cost of 
infinite flight control actuator commands at one extreme.  The other extreme is zero use of flight 
control actuators and not performing the commanded task.  The cost function is adjusted such that 
appropriate flight control actuator commands are given in order to perform a specific flight 
maneuver. 
The original design intention for Stepaniak [32,33] was to use the LQG synthesis of a 
CGT/PI controller to replicate the Block 40 flight control system.  The associated weighting 
matrices were then used to perform the synthesis of controllers for each of the failed actuator 
conditions.  It has been found that a controller designed using LQG synthesis cannot adequately 
model the F-16 Flight Control System (FCS).  This can possibly be attributed to the classical 
design approach taken to design the actual F-16 FCS.  Alternative methods had to be explored in 
order to provide proper control of the F-16 (specifically MMAE-based control with CR) while 
using the MMAE to detect failures. 
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2.5.3 Control Redistribution  
 
Control Redistribution (CR) is the process of applying commands to unfailed actuators/ 
surfaces in order to compensate for a failed actuator.  In this case, the MMAE/FS algorithm 
provides the failure declaration and an estimation of actuator effectiveness in the case of partial 
actuator failures.  The MMAE creates a state estimate and also decides which hypothesis 
represents the ‘real world’ failure status characteristics.  The CR controller uses this knowledge to 
redistribute the control authority to the unfailed control actuators in order to accomplish the 
desired maneuver.  The mathematical formulation of the CR algorithm is presented in detail in 
Section 4.5.3. 
 
2.5.4 Gain Scheduling 
 
Gain Scheduling is the dependence of the flight control surface commands from the flight 
control system on the dynamic pressure (combination of airspeed and altitude).  As the dynamic 
pressure changes, the control system must compensate by increasing or decreasing the commands 
to the flight control surface.  In this research effort, the aircraft will be transitioning the flight 
envelope due to purposeful pilot commanded maneuvers.  Since the CR algorithm is used, the 
Block 40 Flight Control System (FCS) is used.  The Block 40 FCS already incorporates gain 
scheduling to control the aircraft. 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provided the basic background for MMAE/FS and for CR.  The 
developmental history of the MMAE was covered first.  The paths that have led to the current 
MMAE implementation have also been reviewed.  The advantages of the MMAE to create state 
estimates as well as detect failures and the addition of FS allowing the MMAE to produce 
estimates of failure effectiveness has been presented in this chapter.  Finally, the control aspect 
has also been briefly presented in this chapter.
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Chapter 3: Truth and Design Model 
 
 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
 
This chapter presents the derivation of the truth and design models used in this research 
effort.  Section 3.2 discusses the ‘real world’ and introduces the VISTA F-16 aircraft.  The ‘truth 
model’ used in this research effort is the VISTA F-16 SRF simulation tool and is described in 
Section 3.3.  The derivation of the ‘design model’ is shown in Section 3.4, as well as the 
modifications to the ‘design model’ in order to allow for realistic actuator responses.  Finally, the 
failure modes are described in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Real World 
 
The Variable In-flight Stability Testbed Aircraft (VISTA) F-16 aircraft is a flight control 
test aircraft used to provide in-flight simulations of high performance aircraft [11].  The VISTA 
F-16 is a modified F-16D aircraft with a Block 40 flight control system.  The modification allows 
the VISTA F-16 to simulate the responses of various high performance aircraft.  This is 
accomplished by changing the aircraft’s flight control laws in order to achieve the characteristics 
of the aircraft under test.  The advantage of the VISTA F-16 aircraft is the flexibility of the 
control system which provides a useful tool in the development and evaluation of flight control 
systems. 
The VISTA F-16 aircraft was chosen for this research effort in order to continue the 
research efforts already accomplished at the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) [7,9-12, 
17,27,28,32,33].  The original reason behind the decision to use this aircraft was the availability 
of advanced computer simulation tools at the Air Vehicles Directorate, Air Force Research 
Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. 
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3.3 Truth Model 
 
The ‘truth model’ used in this research effort is the VISTA F-16 Simulation Rapid-
prototyping Facility (SRF) simulation tool.  The SRF is a FORTRAN-based, nonlinear six- 
degree-of-freedom, computer simulation of the VISTA F-16 aircraft [11].  Calpsan and General 
Dynamics developed this simulation tool.  The simulation program contains the Block 40 flight 
control system used by the VISTA F-16 aircraft and the flight control actuator dynamics.  The 
Block 40 FCS has saturation (and anti-windup) compensation and the flight control actuator 
dynamics use 4th order actuator models.  The simulation also includes the aileron-to-rudder 
interconnect used for coordinated turns, and allows for direct access of the aircraft sensors and the 
flight control actuators, which is a requirement for this research effort.   
There have been many modifications made to the VISTA F-16 SRF simulation tool 
through the history of this research topic [7,9-12,17,27,28,32,33].  The zero-order Dryden wind 
model was added to the simulation in order to improve the accuracy of the simulation [9,10, 
24,31].  Sensor noise was also incorporated into the simulation as well as a more realistic model 
of the lateral acceleration sensor [32,33].  The Multiple Model Adaptive Estimator with Filter 
Spawning (MMAE/FS) was added to the simulation to provide the capability of detecting 
complete actuator/surface and sensor failures and evaluating the effectiveness of partial 
actuator/surface failures [11,12].  Control redistribution (CR) was added to the output of the flight 
control portion of the VISTA F-16 SRF in order to accomplish appropriate control once an 
actuator failure is identified [32,33].   
3.4 Design Model 
 
The ‘truth model’ is a high order model that accurately depicts the ‘real world’.  The 
‘design model’ is a lower order model that is used to model the ‘truth model’ to a reasonable level 
of fidelity, and it is used in the MMAE/FS/CR algorithm.  The order of the ‘design model’ is 
dictated by the computational limit of the flight control computer.  In this case, the flight control 
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computer operates at 64 Hz.  The ‘design model’ must be of low enough order such that the 
resulting flight control system with the MMAE/FS/CR algorithm must operate within the 64 Hz 
limitation.  The ‘design model’ must also accurately represent the ‘real world’, which sets a lower 
bound on order and complexity of the ‘design model’.  The ‘truth model’ does not have the 
computational limitation that the ‘design model’ has, since the ‘truth model’ does not have to be 
implemented on the aircraft’s 64 Hz flight control computer.  The ‘truth model’ is used as a basis 
or starting point of the reduced order ‘design model’ and also as a verification tool to evaluate the 
operation of the adaptive control system based upon the ‘design model’. 
 
3.4.1 Linearized VISTA F-16 
 
The ‘design model’ is created by the linearization of the nonlinear, continuous-time 
model used by the ‘truth model’ about a nominal point in the flight envelope.  The flight envelope 
is the region of aircraft operation defined by airspeed, measured in Mach number, and altitude, 
measured in feet above mean sea level (MSL).  Previous research efforts have studied the 
response of MMAE/FS/CR at one point within the flight envelope (Mach 0.4 and 20,000 ft) [7,  
9-12,15,24,25,29,30].  This condition was chosen because of the difficulty in detecting sensor and 
flight control failures due to the low dynamic pressure: the previous research focused on detection 
and estimation, and so it was prudent to test against conditions under which the detection and 
estimation would be the most difficult.  The aircraft is in the ‘up-and-away’ flight configuration, 
meaning the leading edge flaps and landing gear are in the up position.  In the current research, 
various points within the flight envelope are tested using model and gain scheduling.  The 
simulation begins at one point within the flight envelope and through the application of pilot 
commands, the aircraft transitions the flight envelope.  This maneuver is used to test the detection 
and estimation capability of the MMAE/FS using ‘model scheduling’ while transitioning the 
flight envelope as well as testing the Block 40 ‘gain scheduling’ and CR algorithms.  It has been 
shown in previous research that as the aircraft moves away from the nominal point (even over a 
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few seconds of maneuvering flight), all failure mode models appear bad if they are not all altered 
as a function of dynamic pressure, thereby incapacitating the MMAE’s detection [9,10].  Thus, 
gain and model scheduling, as a function of dynamic pressure (or altitude and Mach number), is a 
vital component of the operation of the MMAE/FS/CR for maneuvering aircraft vehicles.  As the 
dynamic pressure changes as a result of altitude or airspeed changes, the filter models in the 
MMAE/FS/CR are changed to adapt to the new dynamic pressure.  This is known as model 
scheduling.  As the dynamic pressure changes, the Block 40 flight control gains are also changed 
in order to adapt to the new dynamic pressure.  This type control action is known as gain 
scheduling and is already incorporated in to the standard Block 40 FCS.  This research 
completely demonstrates the operational performance of the MMAE/FS/CR in various regions of 
the flight envelope using gain and model scheduling. 
 
3.4.2 State Space Design Parameters 
 
Once the aircraft’s nonlinear equations of motion have been linearized about a nominal 
point in the flight envelope, the linear, time-invariant (LTI) ‘design model’ is formatted as 
)()()()( tttt GwBuAxx ++=     (3.1) 
where x(t) is the state vector, A is the plant matrix based on the LTI model, B is the control input 
matrix, u(t) is the control input, G is the noise injection matrix, and w(t) is the zero-mean white 
dynamics driving noise.  Previous research has shown the development of these matrices and 
vectors [11,12].  The following chapters will briefly detail their development as they are used in 







3.4.2.1 State Vector 
 
















































x       (3.2) 
 
where the state variables are defined as 
θ(t) Pitch Angle (rad) 
u(t) Forward Velocity (ft/sec) 
α(t) Angle of Attack (rad) 
q(t) Pitch Rate (rad/sec) 
φ(t) Bank Angle (rad) 
β(t) Sideslip Angle (rad) 
p(t) Roll Rate (rad/sec) 
r(t) Yaw Rate (rad/sec) 
 
The first four state variables (θ, u, α, q) describe the longitudinal motion of the aircraft while the 
last four state variables (φ, β, p, r) describe the lateral motion of the aircraft. 
3.4.2.2 Plant Matrix 
 

























































    (3.3)  
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The plant matrix contains elements for both the longitudinal and lateral dynamics of the aircraft.  
The derivatives shown in the upper left of the plant matrix are the longitudinal derivatives, and 
the lateral derivatives are shown in the lower right portion of the plant matrix.  It is seen from the 
plant matrix that the lateral and longitudinal channel state dynamics are independent.  The X′, Y′ 
and Z′ variables represent the aerodynamic forces in the x, y, and z directions, whereas the  L′, M′, 
and N′ variables represent the aerodynamic moments in the x, y, and z directions.  The coordinate 
frame of the aircraft is set up with the positive x-axis direction coming out of the nose, the y-axis 
coming out the right wing, and the z-axis coming out the bottom of the aircraft.  The origin of the 
coordinate frame is established in the early design of the aircraft and does not represent the center 
of gravity of the aircraft.  The center of gravity changes with the payload of the aircraft.  The 
variables are in terms of the angle-of-attack (α) and sideslip (β) angles, hence the primed notation 
(′) according to standard convention [5].  The variables use the shorthand notation  
    Xθ′ = ∂X′/∂θ     (3.4) 
The variable Xθ′ is read, “the partial derivative of the aerodynamic force in the x-axis direction 
with respect to the pitch angle.”  This variable is also read as, “the change in the aerodynamic 
force in the x-axis direction due to a change in the pitch angle.” 
3.4.2.3 Input Vector 
 
The input vector, u(t),  used in this research effort is  












































where the input variables are defined as 
δe(t) Elevator Position (rad) 
δdt(t) Differential Tail Position (rad) 
δf(t) Flap Position (rad) 
δa(t) Aileron Position (rad) 
δr(t) Rudder Position (rad) 
 
3.4.2.4 Input Matrix 
 
































































   (3.6) 
 
where, as before, the aerodynamic forces in the x, y, and z axes are represented by X′, Y′ and Z′, 
respectively, and the moments about the x, y, and z axes are represented by L′, M′, and N′, 
respectively.  The purpose of the primed notation (′) is the same as mentioned in the plant matrix 
Section 3.4.2.2. 
3.4.1.5 Noise Injection Matrix 
 
The noise injection matrix, G, used in this research is  































































   (3.7) 
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3.4.1.6 Dynamics Driving Noise 
 
 The dynamics driving noise is added to the system through the Gw(t) term from the state 
space equation, Equation (3.1).  The dynamic driving noise is zero-mean, white Gaussian noise.  
The strength of the noise is given by the Q matrix.  The dynamic driving noise strength used in 














































Q   (3.8) 
The diagonal noise strengths are associated with the u, α, q, p, β, and r states, respectively.  It is 
seen from the Q matrix that the α and q states are correlated with each other, and the β and r 
states are also correlated with each other.  All other state noises are uncorrelated with each other.  
The units of the Q matrix are shown in Table (1) [11,12]: 
 
Q States Units 
Q(1,1) u ft²/sec 
Q(2,2) α rad²·sec 
Q(2,3) α vs. q rad² 
Q(3,3) q rad²/sec 
Q(4,4) p rad²/sec 
Q(5,5) β rad²·sec 
Q(5,6) β vs. r rad² 
Q(6,6) r rad²/sec 
Table 1: Units of the Dynamic Driving Noise 
 
3.4.3 Redefinition of the Input Vector and Matrix 
 
The initial input vector, u(t), and input matrix, B, defined earlier represent the combined 
surfaces acting as one input into the system.  In other terms, the elevator command is described as 
one variable rather than two, one for the right elevator and one for the left.  In order to apply 
redistributed control commands to the surfaces, the state space input vector and matrix is altered 
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to represent the physical surfaces of the aircraft.  Previous research has shown the development of 
the redefined input vector and matrix [11,12]. 
3.4.3.1 Input Vector 
 









































actδu     (3.9) 
 
where the modified input vector variables are defined as 
 
δls(t) Left Stabilator Position (rad) 
δrs(t) Right Stabilator Position (rad) 
δlf(t) Left Flaperon Position (rad) 
δrf(t) Right Flaperon Position (rad) 
δr(t) Rudder Position (rad) 
3.4.3.2 Input Matrix 
 



















































































































   (3.10) 
 
 
3.4.4 Augmented System 
 
 The state space system with the modified input vector and matrix, is augmented with a 
reduced order actuator design model.  The actuator design model used in this research effort is a 
first order lag approximation.   
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3.4.4.1 Actuator Design Model 
 
The truth model for each actuator used in the VISTA F-16 SRF simulation is a fourth 
order model.  The actuator truth model is 
 
( )( )( )










  (3.11) 
 
The actuator design model used in this research effort, which has been shown to provide adequate 









δ      (3.12) 
 
The actuator design model has a breakpoint at ω = 14 rad/sec which has been shown to yield 
better matching performance than having the breakpoint at ω = 20.2 rad/sec, which might seem to 
be the obvious reduced order model for Equation (3.11) [11, 12].  The actuator design model is 
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3.4.4.2 System Design Augmentation 
 
 Once the state space representation of the actuator design model is defined, that state 
space model is augmented with the actuator design model.  Previous research has shown the 
derivation of the augmented design model [11,12].  The continuous-time augmented model used 
in this research is 
)()()()( tttt augaugaugaugaugaug wGuBxAx ++=    (3.14) 
where 























































  (3.16) 
 
3.4.5 Discrete-Time Model Equivalence 
 
 The continuous-time model derived in the previous section is converted into an 
equivalent discrete-time model [11,12] for implementation on the VISTA F-16 aircraft.  The 
VISTA F-16 digital flight computer receives discrete measurements at a rate of 64 Hz.  These 
sampled measurements are noise-corrupted.  Section 3.4.5.2 shows the measurement vector and 
Section 3.4.5.3 shows the associated measurement matrix. 
3.4.5.1 Discrete-Time Equivalent Model 
 
 Since this research effort is implemented on a digital flight computer, the continuous-
time model derived earlier cannot be used directly.  The continuous-time model must be 
discretized into a discrete-time model that is equivalent to the continuous-time model in the sense 
that, when observed at the sample times, the outputs of the two models are indistinguishable.  The 
discrete-time model has been derived earlier in previous research efforts [11,12].  The discrete-
time model used in this research is: 
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   (3.18) 
 
The variable ∆T is the sample period.  The statistics of the zero-mean, white noise, wd-aug(ti), are 
 




































− = 0     (3.20) 
 
3.4.5.2 Discrete-Time Measurement Vector 
 
The measurement equation used in this research, which has been derived in previous 
research efforts, is 
)()()( iiaugaugi ttt vxHz +=     (3.21) 
 
where Haug is the measurement matrix, and v(ti) is the measurement noise.  The measurement  
 




















































The measurement variables are defined as 
 
α(ti) Angle of Attack (rad) 
q(ti) Pitch Rate (rad/sec) 
an(ti) Normal Acceleration (g’s) 
p(ti) Roll Rate (rad/sec) 
r(ti) Yaw Rate (rad/sec) 
ay(ti) Lateral Acceleration (g’s) 
 
The normal and lateral accelerations are measured at the pilot’s station.  Previous research has 
shown the lateral acceleration model of the VISTA simulation did not provide satisfactory 
performance so it was replaced by a linear model [11,12].  This research effort uses the linear 
model for the lateral acceleration in both the design model and the truth model. 
3.4.5.3 Discrete-Time Measurement Matrix 
 
The measurement matrix, Haug, has been derived in previous research [11,12] and is 
defined as 










































































































δδδδD  (3.25) 
 
and where the U  is the nominal forward velocity used for trim. 
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3.4.5.4 Measurement Noise Vector 
 
The measurement noise covariance of the measurement noise vector, v(ti), is defined as 



































R   (3.26) 
 
 
The units of R are consistent with the units in Section 3.4.5.2 for the components of z(ti). It is 
assumed that the measurement vector is zero-mean and has the statistical characteristic of discrete 
white Gaussian noise.  It is seen from the measurement noise covariance matrix, R, that all the 
measurement noises are uncorrelated. 
3.5 Failure Modes 
 
 Failure modes must be incorporated into the truth model and design model in order to test 
the MMAE/FS/CR’s response to failures.  Failures in this research will be described in terms of 
an effectiveness factor, ε, with a range between zero and one.  An effectiveness of 0%, or ε = 0, 
indicates a complete failure whereas an effectiveness of 100%, or ε = 1, indicates completely 
operational.  Intermediate effectiveness values indicate partial failures. 
 
3.5.1 Truth Model Failure Modes 
 
The truth model has been modified in previous research efforts to incorporate partial and 
complete failures.  There has not been a complete failure mode study accomplished for the 
VISTA F-16 aircraft so failure mode assumptions have been made [11,12].  These assumptions 
are based on previous research in this field [7,9-12,17,27,28,32,33]. 
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 Sensor failures can be modeled in several different ways.  In the ‘real world’, the failed 
sensor can output no measurements except for noise, a bias in the measurement, an increase in the 
noise level, or in the modeling sense, the H matrix can become modified.  The method used in 
previous research and in this research effort is the removal of the measurement while leaving the 
zero-mean white Gaussian noise [11,12]. 
 Flight control actuator or surface failures can also be modeled in several different ways.  
In the ‘real world’, the failed flight control actuator/surface can ‘fail to free stream’, meaning the 
flight control surface does not contribute to the control of the aircraft and that airflow over the 
surface is undisturbed and stability derivatives are unchanged.  The failed actuator/surface can 
also fail in a locked position, contributing a constant control moment to the aircraft.  Portions of 
the flight control surface can be battle damaged, resulting in reduced control authority and 
deterioration in the time response of the actuator/surface.  Reduced hydraulic pressure can also 
yield such a partial failure.  In this research effort, the actuator/surface total failure mode is 
assumed to be ‘fail to free stream’.  This decision is based on previous research efforts in this 
field [7,9-12,17,27,28,32,33].  It is also assumed that the failed surface can still contribute to the 
control of the aircraft if it is only partially failed.  In this case, the actuator would have an 
effectiveness value, ε, between zero and one associated with it.  
  
3.5.2 Design Model Failure Modes 
 
 The use of failure matrices in the linear design model has been introduced in previous 
research efforts [32,33].  The Fai and Fsj matrices are used to alter the design model in order to 
duplicate an actuator/surface or sensor failure.  Fai is the failure matrix for the actuator/surface 
(the subscript a denotes ‘actuator’) where the subscript i indicates the index of the failed 
actuator/surface.  The Fai failure matrix is an identity matrix except for the ith diagonal term, 
which is the effectiveness of the completely or partially failed actuator/surface.  Fsj is the failure 
matrix for a sensor failure (the subscript s denotes sensor) where the subscript j is indicates the 
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index of the failed sensor.  The failure matrices are implemented in the continuous-time design 
models as 
)()()()( tttt augaugaiaugaugaugaug wGuFBxAx ++=    (3.27) 
 
and the discrete-time measurement model is 
 
)()()( iiaugaugsji ttt vxHFz +=     (3.28) 
 
The only difference in the equivalent discrete-time design model with the addition of the failure 
matrix is 
      aiaug
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On a fully-functional aircraft, the failure matrices are both identity matrices.  A failure of an 
actuator/surface is shown by the value of Fai(i,i), where i is the index of the actuator/surface 
failure, becomes the effectiveness value, ε.  This reduces the actuator/surface contribution to the 
control of the aircraft, simulating a failure to free stream.  By adjusting the effectiveness value, a 
partial actuator/surface failure is duplicated.  A total failure of a sensor at the index, j, is 
duplicated by the value of Fsj(j,j) becoming zero.  This eliminates the information for the sensor 
at that index while not eliminating the noise simulating a sensor failure.  In this research, partial 
and complete flight control actuator/surface failures to free stream, and complete sensor failures 









3.6 Chapter Summary 
 
 This chapter presented the various models used in this research effort.  The ‘real world’ 
VISTA F-16 aircraft was presented first, and then the ‘truth model’ VISTA F-16 SRF computer 
simulation was presented.  The state space design of the reduced-order ‘design model’ for the 
MMAE was discussed, including the addition of actuator dynamics.  Finally, the various failure 
modes were presented.  Now that the design models have been derived, they are used to form the 
elemental filter banks and the control redistribution algorithm of the MMAE/FS/CR of the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter 4: Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation with Filter Spawning and 
Control Redistribution (MMAE/FS/CR) Overview 
 
 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
 
 This chapter presents the Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation with Filter Spawning and 
Control Redistribution (MMAE/FS/CR) algorithm in detail.  The first section describes the 
derivation and implementation of the MMAE.  The next section presents the filter spawning 
concept.  This chapter concludes with a description of control redistribution as it applies to this 
research. 
4.2 Filter Models 
 
The models used in this research effort are described in chapter three.  The ‘design 
model’ is used in each of the Kalman filters within the MMAE, each hypothesizing a different 
failure.  The MMAE algorithm compares each model prediction of measurements, before they 
arrive and based on that model’s hypothesis of the current failure status, to the incoming 
measurements and assigns a probability to each hypothesis based on its relative closeness to the 
‘real world’.  The following sections describe the general use of the ‘design model’ in the MMAE 
and model scheduling. 
4.2.1 MMAE Filter Model Description (Kalman Filter) 
 
The MMAE consists of several elemental Kalman filters that run in parallel.  
Measurements are brought in and sent to each of the Kalman filters.  All elemental filters conduct 
a measurement update and, based on their residuals, a probability is assigned to each hypothesis 
by the conditional probability generator.  The hypotheses used for the basis of elemental filters 
within the MMAE in this research consist of several failure hypotheses and one fully functional 
hypothesis.  By analyzing the residuals of each of the elemental filters, the failure status of the 
aircraft is determined.   
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The models used in the Kalman filters are linearized dynamic equations of the VISTA F-
16 aircraft.  These models have been linearized about a trimmed flight condition.  Small 
perturbations in the trim conditions caused by the application of flight controls are the inputs to 
the state space model.  It is seen in chapter three that a failure matrix can be mixed with the input 
matrix of the state space model in order to duplicate a flight control actuator/surface failure to 
free stream.  By using a separate failure matrix for each elemental filter, the elemental hypothesis 
failure models are created.  The fully functional model has the failure matrix equal to an identity 
matrix of the same size.  The sensor failures are also identified in the same fashion except using a 
sensor failure matrix, as is also shown in chapter three.  In the case of a sensor, a zero in the 
sensor failure matrix identifies the total failure.  This creates the failure hypothesis models for the 
failed sensors. 
In an initial implementation, having one filter hypothesize a fully functional aircraft and 
each other filter hypothesize a single failure, previous research has demonstrated the success of 
MMAE in detecting a single complete sensor or actuator/surface failure [7,9-12,17,27,28].  Once 
a single failure is detected, different hypotheses can be brought online that look for a second 
failure.  As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.3.6, a hierarchical method is used in order to look 
for the second failure while maintaining the same number of elemental filters as was used to 
detect the first failure.  The second bank of filters still contains a fully functional aircraft 
hypothesis, in order to back up the decision ‘tree’ of what bank of filters to use in the case of 
additional measurements over time indicating that a failure had not occurred after all.  In previous 
research, this method has shown satisfactory performance in the detection of two complete 
failures [7].  Section 4.3 discusses the filter spawning concept that allows the MMAE to handle 
partial failures. 
Through these basic detection principles, the MMAE depends heavily upon the ‘design 
model’.  Previous research on this topic has been conducted under one flight condition (Mach 0.4 
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and 20,000 ft) because of the difficulty in the detection of failures.  In order to test the MMAE 
completely, the algorithm must be tested under multiple flight conditions. 
4.2.2 Model Scheduling    
 
It has been shown in previous research that if the MMAE is based on a single flight 
condition, and the aircraft moves away from that flight condition, all linear perturbation models 
are invalidated to the extent that an MMAE for failure detection becomes incapacitated: no 
models correctly represents the ‘real world’ situation [9,10].  This drives the requirement for 
model scheduling.  Model scheduling is the process of storing multiple models based on multiple 
regions of the flight envelope.  The flight envelope is the region bounded by airspeed and altitude 
where the aircraft flies.  As the aircraft transitions to a new location within the flight envelope, a 
new ‘design model’ based on a trim condition valid for that region within the flight envelope is 
used, either by simple lookup tables or by interpolation among table entries. 
In the case of the MMAE, the trim condition changes for each of the hypotheses as the 
aircraft moves to a new trim condition.  Model scheduling is required in order to estimate the 
aircraft status correctly throughout the flight envelope.  Having a ‘design model’ based on all the 
trim conditions within the flight envelope completes this.  As the aircraft nears a prestored trim 
condition, the ‘design model’ valid for that region is used.  In this research effort, each prestored 
trim condition is 50 psf (pounds per square foot) from the next prestored trim condition.  This is 
shown later to provide good detection performance.  The ‘design model’ is then incorporated as 
before with the failure matrices in order to search continuously for all failures.  The same is true 
with the measurement matrix.  As the aircraft goes to a new trim condition, the measurement 
matrix that best duplicates the measurements for that trim condition is used.  This process allows 
for the continuous operation of the MMAE for flight control failure detection, even though the 
aircraft is changing trim conditions. 
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4.3 Filter Spawning 
 
Filter spawning is a concept developed in previous research [11,12].  This concept gives 
the MMAE the ability not only to detect failures but also determine the effectiveness of the failed 
flight control actuator/surface for the case of partial failures.  This is accomplished by using the 
MMAE to look for an initial failure.  Once an actuator/surface failure is identified, the filter 
spawning algorithm launches several filters based on that one actuator/surface having failed, but 
each modeled with a different effectiveness.  By blending the MMAE/FS elemental probabilities 
for the fully functional aircraft, the fully failed actuator/surface and the partially failed 
actuator/surface as assumed by the spawned filters, an estimate of the actuator effectiveness is 
made.  This method provides a finer level of discretization and produces a more accurate estimate 
of effectiveness than using a filter based only on a fully functional aircraft hypothesis and a filter 
based on a fully failed actuator/surface hypothesis.  The effectiveness of the partially failed 
actuator/surface is important because the actuator/surface can still be used at the lower 
effectiveness value.  This is important in the case of the F-16 aircraft for which the rudder is the 
surface that produces the primary yawing moment on the aircraft.  If the rudder is operating at 
50% effectiveness, then it is still useful for control of the aircraft whereas in the older 
configuration, the 50% failure of the rudder would be declared completely failed, loosing any 
effectiveness remaining and an important control surface.  The following sections describe the 
filter spawning concept in detail. 
 
4.3.1 Filter Spawning Design 
 
Previous research has explored filter spawning in great detail [11,12].  Presented here is a 
brief description of the filter spawning design and operation.  As mentioned above, the MMAE 
detects the initial actuator failure.  The first step of the filter spawning algorithm is to determine 
the probability of the failure declaration from the MMAE in order to reduce false alarms.  The 
initial detection of the failure is done in a MAP method.  If the probability associated with the 
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failure is large (98% probability of failure), then the failure status is checked as positive.  If the 
failure is a flight control actuator/surface, then the actuator/surface failure is declared and the 
effectiveness of the failed actuator/surface is subsequently determined with the aid of spawning. 
The effectiveness, ε, of the failed actuator/surface is determined by incorporating 
additional filters based on various levels of effectiveness online in the MMAE bank.  This 
provides a finer discretization of the parameter space.  Each spawned filter has a different 
effectiveness value between zero and one.  Zero relates to the completely failed actuator/surface, 
whereas an effectiveness value of one relates to a fully functional actuator/surface.   
 
4.3.2 Creating Estimates With Filter Spawning 
  
The MMAE is used to determine the probabilities associated with each of the spawned 
filters and the Bayesian blending approach is taken in the estimation of the actuator effectiveness.  


















ε      (4.1) 
 
where the ε is the estimate of effectiveness, and the εk value is the effectiveness hypothesis in any 
one of the spawned filters or the associated fully failed actuator/surface elemental filters or the 
fully functional aircraft elemental filter.  Each of the filters is given the probability of pk(ti) by the 
MMAE conditional probability generator.  K is the set of the spawned filters, the fully failed 
actuator/surface elemental filter and the fully functional aircraft elemental filter.  The 
denominator in Equation (4.1) is used as a scaling factor such that all the elemental probabilities 
will sum to equal one. 
4.4 Filter Spawning Implementation 
 
The implementation of MMAE/FS algorithm is broken up into several steps.  The first 
step is the initialization of the filter banks and the application of initial conditions.  The next step 
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is the conventional MMAE computation.  Once a failure declaration is made on a specific 
actuator/surface, the effectiveness is determined.  This section also introduces bank swapping, 
which is the next and final step of this algorithm.  Figure 4 shows the filter spawning algorithm.  
 




The first step in the implementation of the MMAE/FS is the initialization of the filter 
banks.  These banks contain each failure hypothesis for all single actuator/surface and sensor 
failures and a fully functional aircraft hypothesis.  Each bank (except one) also includes spawned 
filters for a particular actuator/surface failure.  Table 2 shows the bank descriptions of the MMAE 
with Filter Spawning [11,12]. 
 
       Bank 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
FF 1 FF FF FF FF FF FF 
 2 LS LS LS LS LS LS 
Complete 3 RS RS RS RS RS RS 
Actuator 4 LF LF LF LF LF LF 
Failure 5 RF RF RF RF RF RF 
 6 R R R R R R 
 7 AA AA AA AA AA AA 
Complete 8 PR PR PR PR PR PR 
Sensor 9 NA NA NA NA NA NA 
Failure 10 RR RR RR RR RR RR 
 11 YR YR YR YR YR YR 
 12 LA LA LA LA LA LA 
 13  LSε21 RS ε31 LF ε41 RF ε51 R ε61 
Spawned 14  LS ε22 RS ε32 LF ε42 RF ε52 R ε62 
 15  LS ε23 RS ε33 LF ε43 RF ε53 R ε63 
Fully Functional (FF) Left Stabilator (LS) Right Stabiltator (RS) 
Left Flaperon (LF) Right Flaperon (RF) Rudder (R) 
Angle of Attack (AA) Pitch Rate (PR)  Normal Acceleration (NA) 
Roll Rate (RR)  Yaw Rate (YR)  Lateral Acceleration (LA) 
Table 2: MMAE with Filter Spawning Bank Descriptions 
 
Previous research began with three spawned failure hypotheses [11,12], but more spawned filters 
can be used to provide a better effectiveness estimate.  The use of more spawned filters also 
increases the computational load, since more filters are required to run in parallel. 
The next step in the initialization of the MMAE/FS is to apply the initial trim conditions 
to all the models within the MMAE/FS.  As the flight conditions change, the new trim conditions 
are applied to all the elemental filters for use in the MMAE/FS in the model scheduling routine.  
The MMAE/FS uses only one bank at a time and the initial starting bank is declared at this time.  
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The aircraft is assumed to be fully functional at the start of the flight.  The lower bound of the 
MMAE is also set.  Previous research has found that a lower bound of 0.001 performs acceptably.  
Initially, the lower bound value is used for all failure probabilities.  All the probability minus the 
sum of the lower bound elemental probabilities for each failure state is initially started in the fully 
functional aircraft hypothesis elemental filter.  At this point, the MMAE/FS is initialized and 
ready to begin operation.   
The implementation of the FS algorithm for this research only uses the banks 2 through 6 
from Table 2.  This was done because considerable software changes would have been required to 
include bank 1 (no active spawned filters).  When the MMAE/FS is initialized, bank 2 is 
arbitrarily used.  The use of bank 1 in the actual aircraft implementation would be a better 
decision. 
 
4.4.2 Conventional MMAE Computation 
 
The next step in the implementation of the MMAE/FS algorithm is the conventional 
MMAE computation.  The equations shown in Chapter 2 (Equations (2.4) through (2.10)) 
describe the state propagation from the previous time to the current time, and the measurement 
update.  From the measurement update algorithm, the residuals, rk(ti), and the covariance of the 
residuals, Ak(ti), are produced.  These values are used to determine the conditional probability, 
pk(ti), of each filter.  The hypothesis that most closely matches the incoming measurements is 
given the highest conditional probability. 
 
4.4.3 Failure Detection, Estimation, and Control 
 
Once the conventional MMAE has been propagated and the measurement has been 
incorporated, the conditional probabilities assigned to each failure hypothesis are analyzed.  If the 
highest probability is above a certain threshold (0.98 for this research effort), the failure 
hypothesis with the highest conditional probability is established.  If this failure hypothesis is the 
fully functional hypothesis, then no failure is declared and the MMAE/FS moves onto the next 
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step.  If the highest conditional probability rests on a sensor failure, then a sensor failure is 
declared and the MMAE/FS moves onto the next step.  If the highest conditional probability lies 
on an actuator/surface failure, then a flight control actuator/surface failure is declared, and the 
appropriate filters are spawned.  At this point, the MMAE/FS uses the spawned filters in the 
current filter bank to assess the degree of failure (or its complement, the degree of effectiveness).  
The spawned filters are used to determine the effectiveness of the actuator using the Bayesian 
blending technique mentioned earlier.  Once the effectiveness of the actuator/surface is 
determined, the flight control commands are redistributed in order to compensate for the 
actuator/surface (partial or full) failure.  Control redistribution is explained later in this chapter. 
 
4.4.4 Bank Swapping 
 
Once the detection, estimation, and control step is accomplished, bank swapping occurs.  
This is required since the MMAE/FS is based on banks of filters.  In order to change the 
particular actuator/surface for which the spawned filters in the current bank are designed, bank 
swapping among the banks defined in Table 2 must occur.  This step consists primarily of two 
parts, the first of which is bank calculation and the second of which is swapping conditional 
probabilities. 
The bank calculation is based on the flight control failure hypothesis with the highest 
conditional probability.  The actuator/surface failure with the highest conditional probability 
determines the bank of elemental filters used to detect and estimate failures.  This presumes that 
there are no spawned filters yet; if there are spawned filters, then their probabilities are summed 
with the probability of the full failure of that actuator/surface.  If a sensor failure hypothesis or 
fully functional hypothesis contains the highest conditional probability, then the filter bank 
without any spawned filters is selected. 
When an actuator/surface failure is identified by the MMAE/FS, the spawned filters for 
that failure are brought online.  The conditional probability within the fully failed hypothesis is 
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evenly distributed into the newly spawned filters and the filter based on the fully failed 
hypothesis.  If the spawned filters are collapsed, (i.e., retracted) the conditional probabilities are 
collapsed into the corresponding fully failed elemental filter [11,12].  
4.5 Control Redistribution 
 
The Control Redistribution (CR) algorithm used in this research effort has been 
previously explored [32,33].  This section briefly describes the previous research efforts to apply 
control based on the estimations of the MMAE/FS.  This section then discusses the 
implementation of CR as it is used in this research effort. 
 
4.5.1 Control Application 
 
There have been two primary types of control investigated for use with the MMAE/FS 
methodology [32,33].  The first type of control is the Multiple Model Adaptive Controller 
(MMAC).  In this controller, elemental controllers are created for each hypothesis using modern 
LQG synthesis [23].  One form of the MMAC applies blended control where, like the estimates 
from the MMAE, the elemental controller commands are weighted with the conditional 
probabilities and summed together.  This is shown in Chapter 2, Figure 2.  In some cases, this 
approach can cause unacceptable aircraft responses since some of the contributing control 
commands are based on failures that have not actually occurred, due to the lower bound on the 
conditional probability.  Another form of MMAC uses MAP methodology in which the elemental 
LQG controller with the highest conditional probability is used to control the aircraft, eliminating 
the insertion of improper control commands.  However, this precludes purposeful blending of 
outputs of more than one elemental LQG controller (which might be useful for best performance; 
recall Section 2.4.1).   
A second type of controller tested in previous research [32,33] is the CR algorithm used 
with an MMAE-based controller shown in Chapter 2, Figure 1.  In this case, the MMAE/FS is 
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used to detect failures and estimate the actuator effectiveness, and that information is used to alter 
the commands from the Block 40 flight control system in order to perform the commanded 
maneuver.  Bayesian blending versus MAP is an issue for both MMAE-based control as well as 
for MMAC-based control.   
 
4.5.2 MMAC Controller 
 
LQG synthesis [23] is used to form the elemental controllers for the MMAC.  The LQG 
synthesis requires three assumptions that are readily met for this application.  The first 
assumption is that the ‘design model’ used is a linear, discrete-time model.  The linear model 
assumption is met because linear perturbation models about trim are used to describe the behavior 
of the aircraft.  The second assumption is that a quadratic cost function is well suited to flight 
control problems.  This is true for flight control problems since the cost function attempts to 
minimize the mean squared deviations in the states while not expending excessive amounts of 
control energy or power to do so.  The final assumption is the use of white Gaussian noise in the 
models.  It has been found in previous research that the noises such as sensor noise and wind 
gusts have been successfully modeled according to this assumption.  The justification for the 
Gaussian noise assumption is through the use of the Central Limit Theorem [21].  
The first part of the LQG synthesis is the LQ regulator.  The purpose of the regulator is to 
determine the control function which minimizes a specific cost function. Recall the discussion in 
Section 2.5.2 and Equation (2.16) for the general cost function.  By balancing the quadratic cost 
function penalties, proper flight control actuator commands are produced in order to achieve the 
commanded maneuver. 
LQG synthesis for this case entails the application of PI compensation rather than a 
simple proportional regulator.  PI compensation is required in order to achieve Type I 
performance characteristics [23], or in other words, to track a constant input signal with a zero 
steady-state error even though constant unknown disturbances are added to the system.  Once the 
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PI compensator is incorporated into the controller, the LQG PI controller gains are determined 
and applied [23]. 
Model following techniques can be used to improve the performance and the robustness 
of the LQG controller.  The first technique that can be used is implicit model following.  In 
implicit model following, the controller is penalized for deviations from the desired system 
response characteristics as specified by the output of the ‘implicit’ system model.  This method 
does not necessarily improve the performance of the system at design conditions but robustness 
can be increased by its use [23].  The second technique that can be used is explicit model 
following.  A Command Generator Tracker (CGT) incorporates this method [23].  The CGT 
forces the system to follow a desired model output, where the model is called the command 
generator.  In this method, the performance of the system as compared to a desired trajectory is 
enhanced, but the feed-forward portion of the compensator does not affect the robustness of the 
system.   
Previous research has shown the attempted design of the CGT/PI controller in order to 
reproduce the commands from the Block 40 flight control system [32,33].  The attempt to use 
LQG synthesis of a CGT/PI controller to replicate the Block 40 flight control system failed 
because the associated weighting matrices that would have been used to perform the synthesis for 
each elemental controller could not be determined.  Various quadratic cost function penalties 
were tried but no cost function was found that gave the LQG based controller the capability to 
follow the desired commands of the Block 40 flight control system.  Therefore, MMAC was 
abandoned in favor of MMAE-based control with Control Redistribution (CR). 
 
4.5.3 Control Redistribution 
 
The alternative method of control, as previously researched [32,33], is Control 
Redistribution (CR).  The advantage of CR is the ability to apply corrective control to the aircraft 
without the need to modify the Block 40 flight control system.  This is advantageous to the user 
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since the original flight control system is used and does not need to be changed or altered and 
then recertified for flight-worthiness.  The CR algorithm uses the MMAE/FS to detect and 
estimate the effectiveness of flight control actuator/surface failures.  The CR algorithm then 
redistributes the command signals from the flight control system to other operational 
actuators/surfaces in order to accomplish the commanded maneuver.  It is assumed that enough 
flight control redundancy is available such that a command intended for a failed actuator/surface 
can be redistributed to the remaining actuators/surfaces to accomplish the desired maneuver.  This 
may not always be the case, since the loss of an actuator decreases the total control authority for 
the aircraft. 
The mathematical basis for CR is presented here [32,33].  The product of the control 
matrix B and the input vector u(ti) for a fully functional aircraft must equal the product of the 
control matrix Bfail and redistributed input vector ur(ti) of the aircraft with a failed 
actuator/surface, as shown in Equation (4.1): 
 irfail tuBBu ≡      (4.1) 
 
The matrix that describes the failure Fai is described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5.2.  The 
actuator/surface failure matrix is an identity matrix with the effectiveness value ε as the ith 
diagonal term corresponding to the fully failed (ε = 0) actuator/surface.  This development is only 
for the case of  ε = 0.  This actuator failure matrix is then used to determine Bfail : 
aifail FBB =       (4.2) 
 
The redistribution input ur is described mathematically by employing a linear transformation 
matrix Dai.  The Dai matrix represents the control redistribution corresponding to the case of the ith 
actuator/surface having failed.  The relationship is: 
)()( iaiir tt uDu =       (4.3) 
 
By substituting Equations (4.2) and (4.3) into (4.1), and realizing the result must be true for all 
values of the control vector u(ti), the resulting equation is generated: 
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BDBF =aiai       (4.4) 
 
Since Fai is rank deficient during complete actuator/surface failures (ε = 0), an inverse operation 
on [BFai] cannot be used to determine the control redistribution matrix, Dai.  A pseudoinverse 
must be taken in order to solve Equation (4.4) for Dai.  The pseudoinverse is denoted in the 
resulting Equation (4.5) by the + superscript [32,33]. 
BBFD += )( aiai       (4.5) 
 
In the case of a partial failure where Fai is not rank deficient, the actual inverse can be 
taken to determine the values of Dai.  Here we consider only the case of total failures.  Using this 
result to treat partial failures will be discussed later.  The pseudoinverse used in this research only 
gives an approximate value that is the best solution in the least squares sense.  A second approach 
to the solution is through the use of a weighted pseudoinverse [23].  This method allows the 
designer to adjust the redistribution matrix to allow more or less redistributed control to go to 
particular actuators in order to compensate for the failed actuator/surface, based upon his or her 





























aD    (4.6) 
  
This equation shows the complete control redistribution matrix for all complete failures.  Its 
columns are the ith column of each Dai of Equation (4.5).  It can also be seen from equation (4.6) 
that the amount of control required in order to compensate for a complete rudder failure is large 
with respect to the other failures.  During the actual simulation, if for example a right stabilator 
failure is identified (i = 2), the control redistribution matrix would be a 5-by-5 identity matrix 
























aiD     (4.7) 
 
If, continuing with the example of the complete right stabilator failure, the actual control used 
based on the knowledge of the failure is 
     )()( iaiir tt uDu =      (4.8) 
 
 
4.5.4 Control Techniques with Partial Actuator/Surface Failures 
 
There are two approaches analyzed in this research effort to apply control to an aircraft 
given a partial failure of the actuator/surface.  The first approach is to adjust the redistribution 
matrix to compensate for the partial actuator/surface failure, and the second approach is to 
increase the control gain on the partially failed channel without applying CR.  The first approach 
involves using the redistribution matrix Dai matrix and multiplying the ith column by the 
complement of the actuator/surface effectiveness (1 – ε) and adding 1 to the ith diagonal term.  
This results in a full command to the partially failed actuator/surface in anticipation that ε of the 
desired response is thereby accomplished; (1 – ε) of the desired response is then achieved through 
the control redistributed to the other actuators/surfaces.  The second approach is to multiply the 
gain of the partially failed actuator by the inverse of the actuator/surface effectiveness.  This is 
actually equivalent to using the development of Equations (4.1)-(4.4) for nonzero ε: with Fai of 
full rank, Equation (4.4) yields Dai = Fai-1.  The first method is preferred in this research effort 
since the cause of the partial failure is unknown.  The second method increases the gain on that 
actuator/surface, and without knowing the cause of the partial failure, this could cause greater 
damage to the aircraft (such as a hydraulic leak in the actuator: by increasing the gain to that 
actuator, the hydraulic system can be drained, leading to other flight control problems). 
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4.5.5 εhat (ahat) vs. εmap (aout) 
 
In previous research efforts, two methods have been used to compute the estimate of 
actuator/surface effectiveness ε [11,12].  The first method uses Equation (4.1) to determine an 
estimate of effectiveness ε̂  = “εhat” of a partially failed actuator/surface.  In previous research 
[11,12] it was found that, while the aircraft was not maneuvering and while applying purposeful 
dither, the εhat created a biased estimate of the effectiveness of the partially failed 
actuator/surface.  To solve this problem, a mapping from εhat to εmap was established 
experimentally to provide good estimates of effectiveness, εmap, given a non-maneuvering aircraft 
using purposeful dither.  This research effort shows the performance difference between the two 
estimates of effectiveness for a maneuvering aircraft without dither. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented the operation of MMAE with filter spawning in order to detect 
sensor failures and detect and estimate the extent of flight control actuator failures for use on the 
VISTA F-16 SRF simulation tool.  This chapter also provided an explanation of the different 
possible control applications once a failure has been identified.  The MMAC controller contains a 
separate elemental controller design for each failure case.  This method relies on LQG synthesis 
to develop the controller.  Unfortunately, LQG synthesis could not produce a controller that 
adequately represented the Block 40 flight control system, so a second approach had to be taken 
to apply corrective control.  This approach uses Control Redistribution (CR) to control the aircraft 
once the MMAE/FS algorithm detects a flight control actuator/surface failure.  CR redistributes 
the control originally intended for a failed actuator, to other redundant flight control actuators in 
order to accomplish the intended maneuver.  The next chapter will present the results of the 
MMAE/FS/CR while flying in various flight conditions.
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Chapter 5 - Results 
 
5.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter provides the results and analysis of this research effort.  Each section will 
introduce the concept, then present the results, and finally present an analysis of the results.  The 
test flight maneuver and flight conditions used to test the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR are 
explained in Section 5.2.  Section 5.3 presents the performance of the MMAE/FS detection 
capabilities.  Section 5.4 shows the capability of the CR to compensate for failed actuators.  
Finally, Section 5.5 shows the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR.  
5.2 Test Flight Maneuvers and Flight Conditions 
 
This section describes the maneuver, flight conditions, and the type of analysis used to 
form the results.  The maneuver is described first, followed by the initial flight conditions.  The 
explanation for the dither removal is then presented.  Finally, the Monte Carlo analysis is 
presented in more detail. 
 
5.2.1 Flight Maneuvers 
 
The original flight condition used in previous research efforts [7, 9-12, 15, 24, 25, 29, 30] 
has been straight and level flight at the airspeed of Mach 0.4 and an altitude of 20,000ft.  Previous 
research [29, 30] into the application of control used a maneuver called a doublet.  A doublet is 
the application of control in one direction, then the application of control in the opposite direction 
using the same magnitude and command duration.  This type of maneuver is useful in the 
detection of failures without significantly changing the dynamic pressure or attitude of the 
aircraft. 
In this research effort, the primary maneuver used to test the MMAE/FS/CR is a set of 
two doublets followed by a long duration commanded maneuver.  This maneuver is created in 
order to detect failures and apply proper control while changing dynamic pressure and aircraft 
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attitude.  The doublets provide sufficient aircraft excitation to make failures apparent to the 
MMAE/FS.  The long duration maneuver provides the demonstration of the CR capability to 
apply proper commands in order to achieve the desired maneuver while the aircraft changes 
dynamic pressure and attitude.   
The longitudinal maneuver used in this research effort consists of two pitch doublets and 
a long duration pitch maneuver.  The failure occurs at one second into the simulation.  The first 
pitch doublet occurs at five seconds and lasts for two seconds.  The second pitch doublet occurs at 
nine seconds and also lasts for two seconds.  The doublet maneuvers occur five seconds into the 
simulation to demonstrate the inability of the MMAE/FS to detect failures without the excitation 
of the aircraft.  In this research effort, the purposeful dither is not used, whereas a final 
implementation of this algorithm might use dither in the absence of pilot commanded maneuvers.  
The duration of the doublet maneuvers was chosen to be two seconds because of the aircraft 
response characteristics.  The long duration pitch maneuver occurs at fifteen seconds and lasts 
five seconds.  The long duration maneuver occurs approximately five seconds after the doublets 
in order to separate the pilot commands and let the aircraft dynamics caused by the doublets 
settle. 
The lateral maneuver consists of two roll doublets conducted with the same time 
characteristics as the longitudinal maneuver.  The lateral maneuver also contains a long duration 
roll maneuver starting at fifteen seconds into the simulation.  The long duration roll maneuver 
lasts for four seconds to roll the aircraft into a desired 40-degree banked turn.  The failure is also 
added at one second in the lateral case as well.  
The complete longitudinal and lateral simulation times are twenty-four seconds.  In all 
maneuvers, the pilot-commanded stick force is five pounds of force.  The longitudinal maneuver 
is used to demonstrate the detection and control performance with stabilator failures and 
longitudinal sensor failures (angle of attack, pitch rate, and normal acceleration sensors).  The 
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lateral maneuver is used to demonstrate the detection and control performance with flaperon and 
rudder failures and lateral sensor failures (roll rate, yaw rate, and lateral acceleration sensors). 
 
5.2.2. Flight Conditions 
 
The flight conditions at the start of the maneuver are straight and level at the airspeed of 
Mach 0.47 and an altitude of 20,000ft.  This flight condition was chosen because it has a dynamic 
pressure of approximately150 psf (pounds of force per square foot) whereas previous research 
efforts conducted at the Mach 0.40 airspeed and an altitude of 20,000ft had a dynamic pressure of 
approximately 100 psf.  This will illustrate the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR at other than 
the proven original flight conditions. 
 
5.2.3. Dither Removal 
 
The dither signal used in previous research efforts has been removed for this research 
effort.  It is found that the dither signal in its current state produces undesirable aircraft control 
performance when combined with purposeful, large maneuvers, resulting in false failure 
detections created by the MMAE/FS.  The dither signal also uses a large percentage of the 
available actuator strength as shown in Table 3.  The removal of the dither signal is discussed 
later in this chapter. 
 
Control Channel Maximum Magnitude Dither Magnitude Actuator Percentage 
Used 
Pitch ±30.25 lbs ±12.00 lbs 39.7% 
Roll ±17.00 lbs ±11.00 lbs 64.7% 
Yaw ±160.0 lbs ±30.00 lbs 18.8% 
 
Table 3: Dither Magnitudes Compared to Maximum Magnitudes Per Channel 
 
5.2.4. Monte Carlo Analysis Definition 
 
The performance of the MMAE/FS/CR is evaluated using a Monte Carlo analysis.  Each 
Monte Carlo analysis is made up of ten separate simulations.  Each simulation uses a different 
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random noise sample but all simulations use the same noise strength for each noise within the 
overall simulation.   
5.3 Failure Detection Performance 
 
5.3.1 Failure Detection 
 
The first major portion of this research effort is demonstrating the capability to detect 
complete and partial actuator failures and complete sensor failures while undergoing maneuvers 
and changing dynamic pressure.  The longitudinal characteristics of the MMAE/FS are analyzed 
first, followed by the lateral characteristics.  The long duration longitudinal maneuver specifically 
shows the performance of the MMAE/FS to detect failures during a change in dynamic pressure, 
due to the large changes in velocity and, to a lesser degree, altitude.  The initial dynamic pressure 
before the long duration maneuver is approximately 150 psf.  After the long duration maneuver, 
the dynamic pressure changes to 130 psf.  In the case of actuator failures, CR based on knowing 
εtrue is used in order to analyze the MMAE/FS performance thoroughly.  Later, in Section 5.4, the 
full MMAE/FS/CR algorithm with failures will be compared both to a fully functional aircraft 
commanded to maneuver (a baseline of what is actually desired from the aircraft) and to this case 
of the CR artificially knowing the εtrue  (a second baseline indicating the best one could hope to 
accomplish via any CR algorithm in replicating the desired aircraft maneuvering).   The following 
plots show the elemental probabilities for each complete sensor and actuator failure and each 














1. Fully Functional Aircraft 
2. Fully Failed Left Stabilator 
3. Partially Failed Left Stabilator 
4. Fully Failed Right Stabilator 
5. Partially Failed Right Stabilator 
6. Fully Failed Left Flaperon 
7. Partially Failed Left Flaperon 
8. Fully Failed Right Flaperon 
9. Partially Failed Right Flaperon 
10. Fully Failed Rudder 
11. Partially Failed Rudder 
 
Longitudinal Sensor Failures 
12. Failed Angle of Attack Sensor 
13. Failed Pitch Rate Sensor 
14. Failed Normal Acceleration Sensor 
 
Lateral Sensor Failures 
15. Failed Roll Rate Sensor 
16. Failed Yaw Rate Sensor 
17. Failed Lateral Acceleration Sensor 
 
These plots show the mean value of the Monte Carlo Simulations as the solid line and the 
mean ± one-sigma (standard deviation) bands are each shown with a dotted line.  The simulation 
time is 24 seconds with the failure initially occurring at one second into the simulation.  The x-
axis of each plot represents the time in seconds. 
On the first set of elemental probability plots (denoted as “Figure _a”), the probabilities 
corresponding to the elemental filters hypothesizing a fully functional aircraft and full 
actuator/surface failures (left stabilator failure, right stabilator failure, left flaperon failure, right 
flaperon failure, and rudder failure) are shown on the top of the page.  On the lower half of the 
page, the probabilities associated with elemental filters based on assumed sensor failures are 
presented (angle of attack, pitch rate, normal acceleration, roll rate, yaw rate, and lateral 
acceleration sensor failures).  On the second page of elemental probabilities (denoted as     
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“Figure _b”), the elemental probabilities corresponding to the spawned filters are presented as 
well as the “combined” probability (formed as the sum of the probabilities for the three spawned 
filters plus the probability of the associated fully-failed-actuator filter) and the estimates of 
effectiveness εhat and εmap.  The “combined” probability is presented to establish a method to 
detect partial actuator/surface failures faster by analyzing the elemental probability in a failed 
channel rather than just in each elemental filter separately.  The εhat and εmap plots are presented to 
determine which estimate of effectiveness produces a more accurate estimate during pilot-
commanded maneuvering.  The solid line on the effectiveness plots represents the mean value of 
effectiveness and the dotted line represents the true value.  The mean ± one standard deviation is 
not shown on the plots for clarity, since the standard deviation is very small.  The effectiveness in 
the plots shows the initial effectiveness value to be 100% fully functional.  In actual 
implementation, the MMAE/FS would not calculate an estimate of effectiveness until after a 
failure is declared.  In this research, the spawned filters are continuously running from the start of 
the simulation to allow easier software implementation (i.e., there are always 15 elemental filters 
and never 12 elemental filters, despite the discussion surrounding Table 2 in Chapter 3).  The 
partial failure hypothesis for the spawned filters is initially started (arbitrarily) as a partially failed 
left stabilator.  Since the MMAE/FS has not declared a failure, the bank initial condition does not 
affect the performance of the MMAE/FS.  As a result of the initial condition, the estimate of 
effectiveness shows 100%, meaning that the Filter Spawning is using the left stabilator partial 
failure hypothesis in the three spawned filters, and the effectiveness of that actuator (left 
stabilator in this case) is declared to be 100%, or fully functional.  The “desired” plot in each of 
the figures shows the pilot-commanded maneuver in pounds of stick force, so the elemental 
probabilities (and later the state values) can be compared directly to the purposeful pilot 
commands. 
Figures 5 – 34 on failure detection performance are presented as a group on the following 
pages.  Then, starting on page 119, they are discussed in detail. 
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Figure 5a: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Pitch Maneuver With Dither 
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Figure 5b: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Pitch Maneuver With Dither 
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Figure 6a: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Roll Maneuver With Dither 
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Figure 6b: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Roll Maneuver With Dither 
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Figure 7a: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Pitch Maneuver 
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Figure 7b: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Pitch Maneuver 
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Figure 8a: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Roll Maneuver  
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Figure 8b: Elemental Probabilities, Fully Functional Aircraft, Roll Maneuver 
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 Figure 9a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0%  
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Figure 9b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0%  
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 Figure 10a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%  
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Figure 10b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%  
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 Figure 11a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% 
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Figure 11b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50%   
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 Figure 12a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% 
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Figure 12b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75%   
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Figure 13b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% 
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 Figure 14a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%    
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Figure 14b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%    
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 Figure 15a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50%    
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Figure 15b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50%   
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 Figure 16a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75%      
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Figure 16b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75%    
 89
   
 Figure 17a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%      
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Figure 17b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%   
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 Figure 18a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25%  
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Figure 18b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25%  
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 Figure 19a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%      
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Figure 19b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%  
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 Figure 20a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75%   
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Figure 20b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75%        
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 Figure 21a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%             
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Figure 21b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%  
 99
 
 Figure 22a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% 
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Figure 22b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25%     
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 Figure 23a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%      
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Figure 23b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%    
 103
    
 Figure 24a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75%     
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Figure 24b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% 
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Figure 25a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 0%             
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Figure 25b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 0%  
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 Figure 26a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 25% 
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Figure 26b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 25%    
 109
    
 Figure 27a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 50%      
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Figure 27b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 50%       
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 Figure 28a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 75%     
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Figure 28b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 75% 
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Figure 29: Elemental Probabilities, Angle of Attack Sensor Failure 
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Figure 30: Elemental Probabilities, Pitch Rate Sensor Failure 
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Figure 31: Elemental Probabilities, Normal Acceleration Sensor Failure 
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Figure 32: Elemental Probabilities, Roll Rate Sensor Failure 
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Figure 33: Elemental Probabilities, Yaw Rate Sensor Failure 
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Figure 34: Elemental Probabilities, Lateral Acceleration Sensor Failure 
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5.3.2 Fully Functional Performance with Dither 
 
Figures 5 and 6 present the MMAE/FS detection performance on a fully functional 
aircraft, using the purposeful dither signal discussed in Section 2.4.3.  In this research, the 
purposeful dither signal is inserted as a pilot command through the cockpit control stick and 
rudder pedals.  The entire dither signal (pitch, roll, and yaw) is turned off when the pilot inputs a 
purposely commanded maneuver.  Thus, as seen in the ‘Desired’ plot of each figure, there is full 
dither over 0-5 seconds, 10-15 seconds, and 20-24 seconds, but there is no dither over 5-10 
seconds and 15-20 seconds.  The ‘Desired’ pilot commanded maneuvers (the doublets and the 
long duration maneuver) are accomplished in the plane under test (pitch maneuvers for the pitch 
test and roll maneuvers for the roll test).  It can be seen from both plots that the elemental 
probabilities initially indicate there are no failures in the aircraft, although the fully functional 
aircraft elemental filter probabilities show a downward trend from the beginning of the simulation 
as compared to the fully-functional aircraft hypotheses without dither in Figures 7 and 8.  The 
aircraft modes (including unmodeled aircraft dynamics) are being excited by the dither signal, 
causing small amounts of probability to disperse to the failed sensor and actuator/surface failure 
hypotheses.  From these figures, the elemental probability mostly moves into the sensor failure 
hypothesis filters in the pitch case and into the rudder failure channel in the roll case.  Once the 
maneuver is initiated, the dither signal is removed and from these figures it can be seen that the 
elemental probability within the fully-functional hypothesis does not substantially change during 
the maneuver.  After the pilot commanded maneuvers (pitch doublets), the elemental probability 
of the fully-functional aircraft hypothesis is reduced and the elemental probability within the 
failed sensor hypotheses increases.  This is a result of the aircraft dynamics following the 
maneuver (such as long and short period aircraft dynamics) and the dither signal occurring at the 
same time, causing additional higher order aircraft dynamics not modeled in the failure 
hypotheses of the linear filters, resulting in false sensor failure detections.  Figure 6 shows similar 
results but the elemental probability moves to the rudder failure hypothesis.  This causes further 
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problems because false rudder failure declarations brought on by the application of the dither 
signal bring the CR algorithm online.  At this point, the CR is causing the aircraft to maneuver 
even more during the period between pilot commanded maneuvers, worsening the detection 
performance of the MMAE/FS.  These results show the need for time between the end of the 
pilot-commanded maneuver and the time to employ the purposeful dither signal.  The purposeful 
dither does improve the detection of actual failures in a nonmaneuvering flight.  The purposeful 
dither signal is not used in the rest of the simulations for this research effort. 
5.3.3 Fully Functional Performance without Dither 
 
Figures 7 and 8 show the performance of the MMAE/FS in a fully functional aircraft 
undergoing the pitch and roll maneuvers, respectively.  This is the same as portrayed in Figures 5 
and 6, but without dither at any time.  These elemental probability plots also demonstrate 
detection problems at the end of the long duration maneuver when the aircraft is placed in a 
different attitude than straight-and-level.  When the aircraft is in a different attitude than straight-
and-level, the current state (as detected by the sensors) does not match any of the linear models 
and appears to the MMAE/FS as a sensor failure, as can be seen at the end of the simulation in 
Figure 7.  The sensors that appear to be the most sensitive to the change in attitude are the failure 
hypotheses based on pitch rate and the yaw rate sensors, as can be seen in Figure 10 for example.  
The elemental linear filters are based on the parameters for straight-and-level flight.  This shows 
the need for model scheduling based not only on the dynamic pressure but also on aircraft attitude 
and nominal values.  This same pattern can be seen in several of the other plots, particularly in the 
partial actuator failure plots.  The spawned filters used in the fully functional aircraft are from the 
partial left stabilator hypothesis (Bank 1 as mentioned earlier in Section 4.4.1).  The bank number 
does not change through the fully functional aircraft simulations.  
By comparing Figures 5 and 6 to Figures 7 and 8, the detection problem at the end of the 
simulation can be seen to be considerably worse without the purposeful dither signal.  The dither 
signal excites the aircraft modes and makes them more visible to the MMAE/FS.  After the long 
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duration maneuver, the dither is applied to the case presented in Figures 5 and 6, whereas Figures 
7 and 8 do not have the dither signal applied. 
In comparing Figure 7 with Figure 8, it can be seen that false alarms on sensors is more 
severe with the pitch maneuvers than with the roll maneuvers.  False partial actuator/surface 
failure alarms are worse with the roll maneuvers than with the pitch maneuvers. 
 
5.3.4 Detection Performance of Fully Failed Actuators/Surfaces other than the Rudder 
 
Figures 9, 13, 17, and 21 show the performance of the MMAE/FS used to detect full 
actuator failures of the stabilators and flaperons.  In all cases, the MMAE/FS detects the failure 
during the first doublet maneuver and maintains the detection through the rest of the simulation.  
Figure 17, which portrays the left flaperon actuator failure simulation results, shows the elemental 
probability moving to the spawned filters during the long duration maneuver, and then the 
elemental probability returns to the correct failure hypothesis.  This is caused by the direction of 
roll.  In one direction, as in this case, the failure identifiability is decreased possibly because the 
other flaperon is providing a greater rolling force.  The one flaperon can produce a greater rolling 
force because when the roll is begun, the sideslip angle increases, and since the rudder is also 
being used to achieve a coordinated turn, the aircraft does not roll solely on the longitudinal axis 
(axis from tail to the nose of the aircraft) but also rotates on the other axes (lateral and vertical 
axes).  This geometry causes a greater rolling force on one flaperon as compared to the other 
flaperon.  The other flaperon case is presented in Figure 21.  This figure illustrates the same 
maneuver, including the same roll direction, but with the failure of the right flaperon actuator.  In 
this case, the elemental probability flows to the correct failure hypothesis and remains there 
through the entire simulation, including the long duration maneuver.  The flow of elemental 
probability to the spawned filter hypotheses in Figure 17 does not detract substantially from the 
MMAE/FS performance since the correct bank is used (the bank corresponding to a partial left 
stabilator actuator failure) and the “error” is primarily declaring ε to be 25% versus 0%.  The 
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elemental probability movement to the spawned filter in Figure 17 between 16 and 20 seconds 
(particularly to the ε = 25% filter) caused by the roll maneuver does cause the estimates of 
effectiveness (both εhat and εmap) to increase from 0% effectiveness for a few seconds.  Once the 
elemental probability flows back into the fully failed left flaperon hypothesis, both estimates of 
effectiveness return to the proper values.  The same pattern can be seen in Figure 18 and Figure 
19.  The 75 percent effectiveness case shown in Figure 20 does not show the same pattern, and 
that can be caused by the lack of failure identifiability with the 75% effectiveness case, as will be 
mentioned in Section 5.3.5.  In all the fully failed cases, the banks chosen by the MMAE/FS were 
the appropriate banks to use, based on the actual failure. 
At the end of the simulation, after the long duration maneuver, the problems caused by 
the aircraft being at a different attitude than straight-and-level can be seen.  Figure 9a shows 
performance at the end of the simulation similar to that of Figure 7a with respect to the elemental 
probability moving from the fully failed left stabilator hypothesis (fully functional hypothesis in 
the case of Figure 7) to the pitch rate and normal acceleration sensor failure hypotheses.  This 
also shows the need to have model scheduling based on aircraft attitude, as well as dynamic 
pressure. 
 
5.3.5 Detection Performance of Partially Failed Actuators/Surfaces 
 
The other figures among Figures 9-24 show the performance of the MMAE/FS in 
determining the correct partial actuator/surface failure condition and providing an estimate of 
actuator/surface effectiveness given partial actuator/surface failures.  In the cases in which the 
partial actuator failure has true effectiveness of ε = 25% and 50%, the εhat provides a better 
estimate of actuator effectiveness than εmap (recall the discussion of εhat versus εmap in Section 
4.5.5), as can be seen in Figures 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, and 23.  The εmap was designed to 
improve performance of the MMAE/FS with acceptably “subliminal” dithers but no purposeful, 
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large maneuvers.  Although it yielded better performance under those conditions, apparently it 
does not for maneuvering flight.   
As mentioned before, after the long duration maneuver, the aircraft is in a different 
attitude than straight-and-level.  This accounts for the difficulty of the MMAE/FS to maintain a 
good estimate of effectiveness after the long duration maneuver, as can also be seen from the 
aforementioned figures.  The MMAE/FS has difficulty detecting and estimating the 75% effective 
actuator/surface cases, as can be seen in Figures 12, 16, 20, and 24.  Since the aircraft is 
maneuvering, the failure identifiability is apparently reduced, as compared to the cases where 
enough failure identifiability exists to determine the 25% and 50% effectiveness cases as well as 
the fully failed case (0% effectiveness).  This is not a major issue since a 75% effectiveness case 
(i.e., 25% failure) still leaves enough control authority to complete the desired maneuvers without 
CR, as will be shown later in this chapter. 
Figures 12 and 16 show the 75% effectiveness partial stabilator failure cases.  From these 
plots, the change in attitude after the long duration pitch maneuver causes false pitch rate and 
normal acceleration sensor alarms.  As mentioned before, the aircraft being in a different attitude 
than straight-and-level causes this.  The εhat estimate shows approximately 100% effectiveness as 
mentioned earlier.  Figures 20 and 24 show the 75% effectiveness partial flaperon failure cases.  
In these cases, it can be seen that, after the long duration roll maneuver, there are no false sensor 
failure alarms and the εhat estimate is approximately correct throughout the simulation.  This 
shows that the elemental filters within the MMAE/FS are more sensitive to changes in pitch angle 
than in roll angle. 
Figures 9-12 and Figures 14-16 show the poor detection performance of the MMAE/FS 
after the long duration pitch maneuver when the aircraft is in a different attitude than straight-
and-level flight.  This is similar to the MMAE/FS performance with no failures shown in Figure 
7.  This shows the requirement of model scheduling as a function of both aircraft attitude and 
dynamic pressure.  It is also interesting to note that Figures 18-20 and Figures 22-24 do not show 
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the sensor failure false alarms.  Based on this, the pitch angle appears to have a more dramatic 
impact on the linear models within the MMAE than roll angle. 
This research effort also includes the “combined” elemental probability plot, which is the 
combination of the probability assigned to the fully failed actuator/surface hypothesis with the 
elemental probabilities of the spawned filters.  This is computed to improve the detection 
performance of the MMAE/FS during partial actuator/surface failures.  A good example of the 
benefits of the “combined” channel is shown in Figure 22, the right flaperon partial failure           
(ε = 25%).  In this case, if the “combined” channel probability is not used to declare the partial 
actuator/surface failure, then the failure declaration would take place at approximately 11 seconds 
into the simulation.  With the “combined” channel used, the partial failure declaration is made at 
approximately 6 seconds.  Since the CR is using the declaration from the MMAE/FS to apply the 
proper redistributive control to the aircraft, the CR must be activated as early as possible in the 
maneuver.  This allows the MMAE/FS to react faster to partial actuator/surface failures than 
looking at each failure hypothesis individually; this was the intention all along, any time there are 
spawned filters (which, in this simulation, is always). 
 
5.3.6 Detection Performance of the Complete and Partial Rudder Failures 
 
Figures 25, 26, 27, and 28 show the poor performance of the MMAE/FS in detecting 
complete and partial rudder actuator/surface failures.  This is in part caused by the lack of a yaw 
maneuver, resulting in reduced failure identifiability for the rudder.  The CR is also used in these 
cases in order to keep the aircraft with an actuator failure close to the original trimmed flight 
conditions.  Since there is not enough control authority in the other flight control actuators to 
compensate for a failed rudder, the CR cannot maintain good control over the aircraft with a 
rudder failure.  This then causes even worse detection failure detection performance by the 
MMAE/FS.  This will be further explained later in this chapter.  The elemental probability flows 
to the correct hypothesis (rudder failure) but also some elemental probability flows to the right 
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stabilator fully failed hypothesis.  This also causes the bank to be swapped, bringing online other 
spawned filters based on partial stabilator failures before swapping back to the correct bank 
representing partial rudder failures. 
 
5.3.7 Detection Performance of Complete Sensor Failures 
 
Finally, Figures 29 – 34 show the capability of the MMAE/FS to detect sensor failures 
during maneuvering flight.  The elemental probability plots of the spawned filters and the 
estimates of effectiveness are left out since they show no information about the MMAE/FS 
detection capability in detecting sensor failures.  In actual implementation, the spawned filters 
would not be brought online for a sensor failure and the MMAE/FS does not provide an estimate 
of sensor effectiveness.  The first figures represent the longitudinal sensors (Figures 29-31) and 
the pitch maneuver is used to excite the aircraft in order for the MMAE/FS to detect these sensor 
failures.  The last figures represent the lateral sensors (Figures 32-34) and the roll maneuver is 
used to excite the aircraft in order for the MMAE/FS to detect these sensor failures.  In all cases, 
the sensor failures were detected by the MMAE/FS during the first doublet maneuver and the 
detection was maintained through the entire simulation.  The two problems found in the sensor 
failure detection capability of the MMAE/FS during pilot commanded maneuvers are the normal 
acceleration sensor failure and the pitch rate and yaw rate sensor failure cases which are 
described below.   
Figure 31 shows the elemental probability plots given the case of a normal acceleration 
sensor failure.  The sensor failure is properly detected by the MMAE/FS but then, after the pitch 
doublet maneuver, the elemental probability flows to the hypothesis based on the lateral 
acceleration sensor failure.  This elemental probability flow is then reversed at the onset of the 
long duration pitch maneuver.  This elemental probability flow is caused by the lack of failure 
mode excitement.  As the aircraft does not maneuver after the completion of the pitch doublet, the 
MMAE/FS has a difficult time maintaining the detection capability of the normal acceleration 
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sensor.  Once the long duration pitch maneuver is begun, enough failure mode identifiability 
exists for the MMAE/FS to identify the correct sensor failure clearly.  This type of elemental 
probability flow is one of the factors for the dither timing (how long after a maneuver is 
completed to apply the purposeful dither signal in order to excite the failure modes, to maintain 
good failure detection performance of the MMAE/FS). 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the effect of being at a different attitude than 
straight-and-level flight can be seen in the MMAE/FS ability to maintain detection of the pitch 
rate and yaw rate sensor failures, as shown in Figures 30 and 32 at the end of the simulation.  By 
implementing model scheduling based on aircraft attitude, as well as dynamic pressure, the ability 
of the MMAE/FS to maintain detection capabilities through large pilot commanded maneuvers 
could be increased. 
5.4 Control Redistribution Performance 
 
5.4.1 Control Redistribution 
 
Once an actuator failure is detected and an estimate of the effectiveness is made by the 
MMAE/FS, the proper control must be applied in order to achieve the desired performance.  The 
following state value plots demonstrate the capability of the MMAE/FS/CR to apply the proper 
control once a full actuator failure is detected.  The longitudinal plots are of the state values of 
pitch angle (θ in degrees), pitch rate (q in degrees per second), angle of attack (α in degrees), 
normal acceleration (an in ‘g’s’), velocity (feet per second) and altitude (feet).  The lateral plots 
are of the state values of roll angle (φ in degrees), roll rate (p in degrees per second), yaw rate (r 
in degrees per second), slipstream angle (β in degrees), and normal acceleration (ay in ‘g’s’).  The 
angle of attack, pitch rate, normal acceleration, roll rate, yaw rate, and lateral acceleration are 




1. Fully Functional Aircraft 
2. Left Stabilator Failure 
3. Partially Failed Left Stabilator 
4. Right Stabilator Failure 
5. Partially Failed Right Stabilator 
6. Left Flaperon Failure 
7. Partially Failed Left Flaperon 
8. Right Flaperon Failure 
9. Partially Failed Right Flaperon 
10. Rudder Failure 
11. Partially Failed Rudder 
 
  The dotted line on each state value plot represents the fully functional performance of 
the aircraft.  The solid line on each of the state value plots represent the mean performance of the 
aircraft given the failures and controlled by the CR.  The mean ± 1 standard deviation is not 
shown because the standard deviation of the states is too small to show.  In these plots, the true 
value of effectiveness, εtrue, is used rather than the MMAE-estimated value, to evaluate the best 
control performance achievable through a CR algorithm, assuming perfect identification of failure 
status.  Subsequently in Section 5.5, the performance of an actually implementable 
MMAE/FS/CR algorithm will be compared to this artificially informed algorithm’s performance.  
As was the case before, the “desired” plots show the desired pilot-commanded maneuver in 
pounds of force on the cockpit control stick. 
Figures 35-56 on CR performance are presented in a group for convenience.  Then, 
starting on page 150, they will be discussed in detail. 
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Figure 35: State Values, Fully Functional Aircraft, Pitch Maneuver 
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Figure 36: State Values, Fully Functional Aircraft, Roll Maneuver  
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Figure 37: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0%  
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Figure 38: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%  
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Figure 39: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50%   
 133
 
Figure 40: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75%   
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Figure 41: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 0%    
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Figure 42: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25%   
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Figure 43: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50%     
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Figure 44: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75%     
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Figure 45: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%      
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Figure 46: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25%      
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Figure 47: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%                  
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Figure 48: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75%    
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Figure 49: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0%             
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Figure 50: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% 
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 Figure 51: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50%       
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Figure 52: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75%       
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Figure 53: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 0%             
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Figure 55: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 50%       
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Figure 56: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 75% 
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5.4.2 Control Redistribution Performance with Fully Functional Aircraft 
 
Figures 35 and 36 present the fully functional aircraft cases for the pitch and roll 
maneuvers, respectively.  These maneuvers are used as a baseline for the other figures 
representing the failure cases.  The pitch maneuver is used for the longitudinal actuator failure 
cases (stabilators) and the roll maneuver is used for the lateral actuator failure cases (flaperons 
and rudder).  It can be seen from Figures 35 and 36 that the fully functional aircraft state values 
are not exactly zero (or their nominal cases such as in angle of attack).    The lateral state 
oscillations during the pitch maneuver in Figure 35, and the longitudinal state oscillations in 
Figure 36 are caused by the Block 40 Flight Control System (FCS) and are small in magnitude, as 
can be seen by the axis magnitudes.  The large oscillations in the lateral states in Figure 36 are 
purposeful and are large in magnitude as compared to the lateral oscillations from Figure 35.  It is 
important in review these figures (and all figures) to take note of the y- axis scale. In Figure 36, 
the aircraft looses altitude and gains airspeed at the end of the simulation.  This is caused by the 
lack of autopilot control over the aircraft.  As the aircraft rolls to approximately 40 degrees of 
bank, the nose of the aircraft drops since there is not backpressure on the pilot control stick 
applied and the autopilot system is not used. 
 
5.4.3 Control Redistribution Performance with Full Actuator/Surface Failures other than the 
Rudder 
 
The performance of the CR algorithm given complete actuator failures is shown in 
Figures 37, 41, 45, and 49 for the stabilator and flaperon failures.  Once the failure is declared by 
the MMAE/FS, the CR algorithm is activated based on the failure declaration and these figures 
show the control performance of the CR algorithm.  The effectiveness εtrue is used in the CR 
algorithm in all cases when that algorithm becomes activated, in order to demonstrate the best 
possible control given the exact value of failure effectiveness.  In all the failure cases, the largest 
variation from the desired maneuver pitch and roll angles is approximately one to two degrees.  
The delays are caused mostly by the time the MMAE/FS requires to make the initial declaration.  
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Figure 37 clearly shows this.  This is the completely failed left stabilator case.  The aircraft begins 
the doublet maneuver and the aircraft begins to roll, as can be seen in the lateral states.  The 
MMAE/FS then makes the failure declaration and the CR algorithm is brought online.  At that 
point, the roll stops at less than one degree and does not increase through the rest of the 
simulation.  It can be seen, for instance from Figure 37, that the dotted line representing the 
desired pitch maneuver performance matches Figure 35, once one notes the scale change on the 
plots.  The same is true for the roll maneuvers and Figure 36.  
 
5.4.4 Control Redistribution Performance with Partial Actuator/Surface Failures 
 
The partial actuator failure performance is presented in Figures 38 - 40, 42 - 44, 46 - 48, 
and 50 - 52 for the stabilator and flaperon partial failures.  From these figures, it can be seen that 
the CR algorithm functions properly, given the failure declaration from the MMAE/FS and 
knowing the effectiveness of the partially failed actuator/surface exactly.  The aircraft tracks the 
desired maneuver with little deviation.  The only times the aircraft does not track the desired 
maneuvers properly is after the long duration maneuver.  This is caused by the poor detection 
performance of the MMAE/FS while at a different aircraft attitude than straight-and-level.  
Consistent with the results seen in Section 5.3, this leads to a strong recommendation later in 
Chapter 6 that model scheduling be based on both dynamic pressure and aircraft attitude, and not 
just dynamic pressure as in these simulations.  Since the MMAE/FS does not make the correct 
failure declaration while at the different aircraft attitude, the CR does not apply the proper control 
to the vehicle.  This can be clearly seen in Figure 48, the 75% effective left flaperon failure case.  
The control is appropriate to track the desired maneuver until the completion of the long duration 
maneuver, when the aircraft is in a different attitude.  At this point in this case, the MMAE/FS 
does not make the proper failure determination, causing the application of incorrect control by the 
CR.  The cause of the jump in roll angle at the end of the simulation in Figure 48 is caused by the 
lack of proper control over the aircraft.  The aircraft does not roll as fast with the partially failed 
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left stabilator and the CR is not applying correct control at that time because the MMAE/FS is not 
declaring the left flaperon failure.  Since the aircraft is not rolling as fast but the flight control 
system is being ‘told’ that all its actuator/surface commands are being followed, the Block 40 
Flight Control System (FCS) is alerted to the lack of proper control through the MMAE estimates 
of the sensor measurements.  Detecting that the aircraft is not rolling as fast as commanded, the 
Block 40 FCS increases the gain to the flaperons, causing the aircraft roll angle to jump 
momentarily.  
 
5.4.5 Control Redistribution Performance with Rudder Failures 
 
 Figures 53 through 56 represent the CR attempt to control the aircraft given various 
rudder actuator failures.  The aircraft does not have enough control authority in the fully 
functional flight control actuators to compensate for the failed rudder.  The CR applies maximum 
control to the other flight control surfaces, resulting in large deviations from the desired roll 
maneuver.  This maneuvering also affects the MMAE/FS because the rapid maneuvering caused 
by the saturated stabilator and flaperon channels adds unmodeled dynamics to the aircraft, 
violating the linear model approximations of the failure hypotheses elemental filters. 
5.5 MMAE/FS/CR Combined Performance 
 
 
5.5.1 Combined MMAE/FS/CR 
 
The performance of the complete MMAE/FS/CR is presented here.  In the previous 
sections, the effectiveness value, ε, is treated as a known value in order to present the 
performance of the MMAE/FS and the CR separately.  In this section, the ε value estimated by 
the MMAE/FS is directly used in the CR.  Based on the analysis between εmap and εhat presented 
in Section 5.3.5, the more accurate estimate of εhat is used.  Although εmap was found to be 
preferable for the case of no maneuvering with dither inputs, εhat appears to be more suitable for 
the case of a maneuvering aircraft without purposeful, additional dithering inputs.  The elemental 
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probability and state value plots are presented in the same order as above for actuator failures.  
Sensor failures are not presented for this case since they are not affected by the estimate of 
effectiveness.  The solid lines show the mean values in the elemental probability plots and show 
the mean performance of the CR in the state value plots.  The dashed lines represent the mean ± 
one standard deviation in the elemental probability plots and shows the desired values of the fully 
functional aircraft in the state value plots. 
Figures 57-76 on MMAE/FS/CR combined performance are now presented as a group for 
convienence.  Then, starting on page 214, they will be discussed in detail. 
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Figure 57a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 57b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 57c: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 58a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 58b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 58c: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 59a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 59b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 59c: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 60a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 60b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 60c: State Values, Left Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 61a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 61b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 61c: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT  
 169
 
Figure 62a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 62b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 62c: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 63a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 63b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 63c: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 64a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 64b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 64c: State Values, Right Stabilator Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 65a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 65b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 65c: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 66a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 66b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 66c: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 67a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 67b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 67c: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 68a: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
 188
 
Figure 68b: Elemental Probabilities, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 68c: State Values, Left Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 69a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT   
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Figure 69b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 69c: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 70a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 70b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 70c: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 71a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 71b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 71c: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT  
 199
 
Figure 72a: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 72b: Elemental Probabilities, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 72c: State Values, Right Flaperon Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 73a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 73b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 73c: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 0% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 74a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 74b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 74c: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 25% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 75a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 75b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT 
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 Figure 75c: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 50% Using ε HAT  
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Figure 76a: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 76b: Elemental Probabilities, Rudder Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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Figure 76c: State Values, Rudder Failure, ε = 75% Using ε HAT 
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5.5.1 MMAE/FS/CR Performance with Full Actuator/Surface Failures 
 
These figures show the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR used to detect and estimate 
flight control actuator failures and apply the appropriate control to achieve the desired control 
performance.  In Section 5.4, the best achievable CR performance was analyzed showing the 
control performance based on the MMAE/FS used to detect the failure and εtrue used by the 
artificially informed CR algorithm.  In this case, the εtrue is replaced by εhat as estimated by the 
MMAE/FS.  It is seen from these figures that the MMAE/FS/CR is able to track the desired 
maneuver properly in most cases. 
The MMAE/FS/CR is affected as before by the lack of linear models representing the 
change in aircraft attitude.  This is even more important in this case, since the models are used 
also to determine the estimate of effectiveness driving the CR algorithm.  In the cases of complete 
actuator failures shown in Figures 57, 61, 65, and 69, the εhat value is correct through most of the 
simulation, leading to the proper redistribution of control by the CR algorithm.  This can be seen 
in the state value plots of these figures.  At the end of the simulation, these figures also show the 
degradation of control from that seen in Section 5.4 caused by the poor εhat estimate due to the 
change in attitude.   
 
5.5.2 MMAE/FS/CR Performance with Partial Actuator/Surface Failures other than Rudder 
 
The partial actuator failures shown in Figures 58 - 60, 62 - 64, 66 - 68, and 70 - 72 show 
the change in attitude effects clearly.  The elemental probabilities show the poor performance at 
the end of the simulation with the aircraft in a different attitude than used for the elemental filter’s 
design (i.e., straight-and-level), and the state value plots show the degradation of CR performance 
due to the MMAE/FS estimates.  This clearly shows the need for model scheduling based on the 
attitude of the aircraft, as well as on dynamic pressure.   
The partial actuator failures also show improved εhat estimation performance in the 75% 
failure cases shown in Figures 60, 64, 68, and 72 in comparison to the εhat estimation performance 
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from Section 5.3.  This is most probably due to the additional maneuvering based on εhat changing 
in this case, as opposed to the constant εtrue value used in Section 5.3.  Since εhat changed in this 
case, the CR based on the MMAE/FS-produced εhat value causes the aircraft to maneuver slightly 
more, making the 75% effectiveness case identifiable to the MMAE/FS.  
The partial stabilator actuator failures also show a constant roll rate once the CR 
algorithm is initiated.  This roll rate can be seen in Figures 58 - 60 and 62 - 64.  This is caused by 
the mechanical biases in the simulation.  The stabilators and flaperon positions are not equal to 
zero during straight-and-level flight due to the design of the aircraft.  The difference between the 
zero position and the flight surface position during straight-and-level flight, for this research, is 
the mechanical bias.  The CR uses the εhat to account for these biases, but if the εhat is not exact, 
then some of the bias will remain and cause the aircraft to roll as shown in these figures.  In 
Section 5.4, this adverse roll was not present in the state value plots given partial stabilator 
failures because the εtrue was used instead of the MMAE/FS estimate εhat. 
In Figures 67 and 71, it can be seen from the roll angle in the state value plots that the roll 
angle jumps across the desired control performance (fully-functional aircraft performance).  This 
is caused by the inaccurate estimation of the partial actuator/surface failure effectiveness by the 
MMAE/FS.  Since the estimate of effectiveness is not correct, the control applied to the aircraft is 
not the appropriate control for the failure conditions.  As a result, the Block 40 Flight Control 
System (FCS), through the MMAE reconstructions of the sensor measurements (best estimates of 
sensed variables as if there were no sensor failures), detects the lack of good control performance.  
The Block 40 FCS then increases the gain in the flaperon channels, resulting in the jump in the 
roll angle state value.  Even though the state value jumps, the overall performance is similar to 





5.5.3 MMAE/FS/CR Performance with Rudder Failures 
 
The rudder failure cases also showed performance similar to the results obtained in 
Section 5.4.  Since the control authority required could not be achieved with the remaining 
control surfaces on the aircraft, the remaining control surfaces were driven to saturation, resulting 
in the poor control performance of the CR algorithm.  This can be seen in Figures 72 - 74.  It is 
interesting to note that in Figure 75, the 75% effective partial rudder failure case, enough control 
authority remained to track the desired maneuvers properly.  The jumps in the roll angle state 
values are caused by the Block 40 FCS detecting the lack of appropriate control (in this case, 
caused by the lack of control authority), as mentioned in the partial actuator/surface failure case.  
Unfortunately, this is not a true representation of the performance of the CR, since the reason the 
CR does a decent job of following the desired maneuver is because the εhat is incorrect from the 
MMAE/FS.  The errors in εhat are brought on by the attitude changing, altering the redistribution 
gains, which then do not drive the actuators into saturation.  Section 5.4 shows the performance 
of the 75% rudder partial actuator failure with εtrue and there is not enough control authority to 
achieve the desired maneuvers using CR. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter demonstrated the performance of the MMAE/FS to detect full and partial 
actuator failures and complete sensor failures.  This chapter also demonstrates the shortcomings 
of the current design of the MMAE/FS and suggests some possible solutions to enhance the 
detection capability, such as model scheduling based on aircraft attitude, as well as on dynamic 
pressure.  This section also demonstrated the control performance of the CR to apply proper 
control to an aircraft with a fully or partially failed actuator in order to accomplish a desired 
maneuver, in the case in which the effectiveness of the partially failed actuator/surface is 
artificially assumed to be known perfectly, in order to demonstrate the best performance one 
 217
could hope to achieve from the CR algorithm.  Finally, this chapter presented the complete 
MMAE/FS/CR algorithm and its ability to detect complete and partial failures and estimate the 
effectiveness of the partial failures, and using this information to apply CR to correct for the 
failed actuators in order to accomplish a desired maneuver.  
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Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the conclusions and recommendations for this research effort based 
on the achieved results.  Section 6.2 presents the conclusions based on the failure detection 
performance of the MMAE/FS, while Section 6.3 presents the conclusions based on the control 
redistribution performance of the CR.  Section 6.4 presents future applications of this research in 
the fields of Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).  Finally, Section 6.5 presents the 
recommendations for further research in this field. 
6.2 Failure Detection Conclusions 
 
The results of this research effort have shown the need for model scheduling based on 
dynamic pressure and aircraft attitude.  The performance of the MMAE/FS can also be improved 
by making the elemental filters’ dynamic noise strength and measurement noise covariance (Q 
and R) matrices adaptive to the maneuvers encountered.  These additions will greatly increase the 
capability of the MMAE/FS to detect failures while undergoing pilot commanded maneuvers.  
This enhanced detection is important, especially in the case of partial failures.  It can be seen 
from the results that, due to the less accurate estimations of effectiveness, the proper control was 
not always applied.  If the linear models are enhanced, then the MMAE/FS will provide better 
estimates during partial actuator failures.  The results of this research effort have also shown the 
detection performance using a purposeful set of pilot induced commands.   
The application of the MMAE/FS to detect failures while maneuvering can benefit from 
adaptive Q and R matrices.  In this research, the original Q and R matrix values [11,12] are used.  
These values were determined based on non-maneuvering flight.  During maneuvering flight, 
unmodelled dynamics can appear in the residuals.  These unmodeled dynamics can appear as 
sensor failures, causing false declarations.  One method of solving this problem is to change the 
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Q and R matrix values to compensate for the maneuver [18,19,29].  The Q matrix is changed in 
order to compensate for the changing aircraft attitude, since the models are based on straight-and-
level flight conditions, and thus the problem is inadequacies of the assumed linear perturbation 
dynamics model.  The R matrix is changed in order to compensate for the sensors detecting the 
unmodelled dynamics.  Once the maneuver is completed, the Q and R matrices may be returned 
to their original values in order to improve the detection of failures.  By using this method, failure 
detection and estimation of the MMAE/FS can be improved, which also improves the estimate of 
effectiveness in the case of partial actuator failures, allowing for better CR response. 
The current research has also shown the need for model scheduling based on the dynamic 
pressure and attitude of the aircraft.  The model scheduling based on dynamic pressure has been 
added in this research effort and has been shown to enable the MMAE/FS to detect failures and 
maintain good estimation capabilities while transitioning the flight envelope (changing of both 
airspeed and altitude).  Previous research efforts [9,10] showed that even small deviations in 
dynamic pressure incapacitate the failure detection capability of the MMAE.  It can also be seen 
from this research that, when the aircraft is in a different attitude than straight-and-level, the 
elemental filters based on the straight-and-level flight condition no longer produce good failure 
detection and estimation capabilities.  This demonstrates the need for model scheduling based not 
only on dynamic pressure, but also on the attitude of the aircraft.  
An alternative method for improving the performance of the MMAE/FS to detect failures 
besides a purposeful dither signal is the application of pilot-induced maneuvers.  In previous 
research [11,12], dither is used to excite the aircraft to allow the MMAE/FS to detect failures in 
the absence of pilot-commanded maneuvers.  The design problem with the dither signal is having 
a large enough command magnitude to detect failures while remaining subliminal to the pilot.  An 
alternative to using the dither signal is using a set of automated commands initiated by the pilot to 
check the failure status of the aircraft.  Since the pilot initiates the commands, there is no need for 
the commanded maneuvers to remain subliminal.  This allows larger command magnitudes to be 
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used to increase the failure status identifiability of the MMAE/FS.  Both methods can also be 
combined in implementation.  The dither signal can be used to detect failures automatically, while 
giving the pilot the capability to initiate the automated sequence of commands to detect and 
identify failures not detected using the subliminal dither signal. 
6.3 Control Redistribution Conclusions 
 
This research showed the ability of the CR to apply the correct alteration to the Block 40 
flight control system commands in order to achieve a desired maneuver in the face of 
actuator/surface failures.  The CR tracked the desired maneuver in most cases with the 
MMAE/FS used to declare actuator/surface failures and when the effectiveness of a partially 
failed surface is exactly known.  The case where the effectiveness of a partially failed surface is 
exactly known is used to demonstrate the best possible control capability of the CR.  The CR has 
shown its capability to maintain desired control while using long duration maneuvers and while 
transitioning the flight envelope.  The CR is extremely dependent upon the effectiveness in the 
case of partial failures, as can be seen in the results when the MMAE/FS provide both the 
declaration of an actuator/surface failure and the estimate of actuator/surface effectiveness.  In 
order to achieve the desired performance from the CR, the MMAE/FS or other algorithm used for 
the detection and estimation of actuator failures must supply a reliable and accurate declaration of 
actuator failure and estimate of actuator effectiveness. 
One point where the CR cannot apply the appropriate control is in the case of rudder 
failures as shown in Section 5.3.6.  Since the F-16 aircraft only has one rudder, the other flight 
control surfaces must work extremely hard in order to achieve the desired performance given a 
rudder failure.  In this case, the other control surfaces do not provide enough control authority to 
compensate for the rudder failure.  Since the Block 40 flight control system is being told that it is 
working with a fully functional aircraft, detecting the lack of yaw caused by the failed rudder, 
increases the gain to the rudder.  This gain is redistributed to the other surfaces but even with full 
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detection, the desired yaw moment is not achieved.  One method of handling this case in actual 
implementation is not to apply CR to the rudder failure case.  The pilot should be alerted to the 
rudder failure.  This procedure is acceptable in the view of this author because the rudder control 
is not essential for this type of aircraft.  In other aircraft that have two vertical stabilators with two 
rudders, CR should be employed in the case of a single rudder failure since another redundant 
flight control surface is available. 
The CR performance is heavily dependent on the algorithm used for failure detection and 
partial actuator/surface estimate of effectiveness (in this research, the MMAE/FS).  If the 
declaration from the detection algorithm is not correct (false declaration or no declaration), or if 
the estimate of actuator/surface effectiveness is not accurate, the CR will not apply the proper 
control to accomplish the desired pilot-commanded maneuver.  Unfortunately, as shown in this 
research, if the proper control over the aircraft is not accomplished, the Block 40 Flight Control 
System (FCS) will detect it through the estimates of the sensor measurements and improperly 
increase the command magnitudes to the actuators/surfaces in an effort to achieve the desired 
performance.  The Block 40 FCS is unaware of the actuator/surface failure and the increase in 
command magnitude is redistributed, causing a jump in the state values.  In this research, the 
jumps in state values particularly occurred in the roll angle state values and were typically less 
than a ten-degree jump in roll angle.  The pilot will notice this but the jump in roll angle will not 
damage the aircraft.  A method that might solve this problem is to redefine the redistribution 
matrix using the weighted pseudoinverse [23] rather than the unweighted pseudoinverse as used 
in previous research [32,33].  With the weighted pseudoinverse, penalties in the form of a cost 
function can be placed on the use of operating control surfaces used to compensate for the failed 
control surface.  In the case of a flaperon failure, it may be beneficial to use the stabilators 
(differentially) rather than the rudder.  This can be done by increasing the cost of using the rudder 
with respect to the cost of using the stabilators in the weighted pseudoinverse cost function.  
 222
Using the weighted pseudoinverse gives the designer more control over which flight control 
surfaces are used to compensate for a failed flight control surface. 
Two methodologies of partial actuator failure control are examined here.  The first 
method is simply to increase the gain to the partially failed actuator and the second method is to 
apply CR based on the effectiveness of the partially failed actuator.  These methods are discussed 
in Section 4.5.4 and the later control logic (CR) is used based on that discussion.  The first 
method results in the aircraft perfectly following a desired maneuver assuming there is enough 
control authority left in the partially failed actuator/surface.  For example, if an actuator has an    
ε = 25%, increasing the gain by a factor of four to achieve the desired maneuver might not be 
possible.  The issue with simply increasing the gain to the partially failed actuator/surface is that 
the exact reason for the failure may not be known and increasing the gain could cause more 
problems with the aircraft, including disabling other flight control actuators/surfaces.  An 
example of this case is a hydraulic leak on an actuator.  If the gain is increased to the 
actuator/surface, this could cause the hydraulic leak to drain the hydraulic fluid from the aircraft 
which then disables other flight control actuators.  In the opinion of the author, the best method to 
handle partial failures based on current aircraft technology is through the use of CR as shown in 
the results.  The CR still uses the partially failed actuator but does not increase the gain to that 
actuator so as not to cause potentially further damage to the aircraft.  Increasing the gain to 
compensate for a partial actuator failure may be appropriate for some aircraft, such as fly-by-
power aircraft in which electronic servomotors are used to drive the flight control surface. 
There are some of limitations of CR.  These include the drag induced by the control 
redistribution and the control authority.  CR uses other functional actuators to compensate for a 
failed actuator.  By using other actuators, the amount of induced drag created by the flight control 
surfaces is increased.  This is a limitation since now more thrust is required in order to 
compensate for the increased application of control surfaces.  Another limitation of the CR is the 
control authority required to compensate for a failed actuator.  In this research, simple pitch and 
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roll commands are used to show the performance of the CR.  In actual use, combined large pitch 
and roll commands are employed.  This can quickly overwhelm the CR with a complete actuator 
failure.  There may not be enough control authority in these cases to provide proper control of the 
aircraft given a complete actuator failure.  This is especially important in the case of multiple 
actuator failures. 
6.4 Applications for UAV 
 
Through this and previous research efforts, the MMAE/FS/CR has been shown to detect 
complete and partial flight control actuator failures and complete sensor failures without direct 
pilot interaction.  The MMAE/FS has been shown to detect failures in both the flight control 
actuators/surfaces and sensors.  In the case of partial flight control actuator/surface failures, the 
MMAE/FS creates an estimate of effectiveness, as well as the failure declaration.  The declaration 
and estimate of effectiveness are then passed to the CR algorithm to redistribute the control 
authority properly to other operational flight control actuators/surfaces to compensate for a 
completely or partially failed flight control actuator/surface.  The MMAE/FS is implemented 
without changing the air vehicle’s flight control system.  The sensor information is used to update 
the MMAE/FS, and then the MMAE/FS produces a state estimate, which is fed into the flight 
control system.  This information, with the pilot commands, is also used to determine sensor and 
flight control actuator failures.  The CR algorithm is implemented at the output of the onboard 
flight control system and adjusts the surface commands produced by the flight control system in 
order to redistribute the commands to operational flight control actuators in the case of partial or 
complete flight control actuator failures.  The MMAE/FS/CR algorithm has been proven through 
various flight conditions and failure cases, and the actual implementation of the MMAE/FS/CR 
does not consist of major software changes to the onboard flight control system itself. 
The purposeful dither is a sinusoidal command to the flight control system used to excite 
the aircraft in the absence of pilot-commanded maneuvers.  On piloted aircraft such as the VISTA 
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F-16 aircraft, the magnitude of the purposeful dither signal is kept to a minimum so as not to 
bother the pilot.  Unfortunately, a low magnitude dither signal may not be able to yield complete 
detection and identification of all failure modes.  For UAV applications, the purposeful dither 
signal magnitude can be larger in order to excite the aircraft in the absence of controller 
commands and thus enable detection of most if not all failure modes, since there is no pilot 
onboard.  This condition improves the detection performance of the MMAE/FS while the aircraft 
is not maneuvering.   
The major advantage of using the MMAE/FS/CR on a UAV aircraft is that, if the aircraft 
is damaged during a mission, the MMAE/FS can detect and evaluate the damage and inform the 
controller, and the CR can compensate for the damage (assuming enough control authority is 
remaining in the other flight control surfaces), allowing the controller to return the UAV to base 
for repairs.  This capability can save assets and the costs associated with them, such as the cost to 
replace a damaged UAV that had to be destroyed.  Moreover, it can increase the chances of 
accomplishing missions since the controller will have better information on the status of the UAV 
and can make informed decisions whether to continue a mission with a slightly damaged UAV or 
return the UAV to base to effect repairs. 
Future advances are available in the area of MMAE/FS/CR application on UAV aircraft.  
Filter design models can be altered and new algorithms made for tailless aircraft technology.  
Providing the MMAE/FS with more sensor information, such as inertial navigation system 
information, will improve the detection and estimation capability of the MMAE/FS.  The use of a 
UAV software simulation platform would greatly improve the capability to test the 
MMAE/FS/CR on UAV platforms.  These are some of the improvements that can be made to the 
MMAE/FS/CR with respect to the application to UAV aircraft. 
This section presented the advantages of implementing a MMAE/FS/CR algorithm on a 
UAV platform.  This section briefly presented the implementation of the MMAE/FS/CR 
algorithm on a UAV, and the advantage of being able to increase the magnitude of the purposeful 
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dither signal to improve the detection and estimation capability of the MMAE/FS.  The ability of 
the MMAE/FS to provide more information concerning the failure status of the UAV to the 
controller and for the CR to compensate for the failures (assuming a flight control 
actuator/surface failure) to allow the UAV to continue with the mission or to return to base to 
effect repairs is also addressed in this section.  Finally, the opportunities for further advancement 
in the area of applying MMAE/FS/CR to UAV aircraft are presented in this section. 
6.5 Recommendations 
 
In order to improve the performance of the MMAE/FS/CR, there are several 
recommendations for further research that can be exploited.  These recommendations are the 
application of dynamically changing R and Q matrix values, model scheduling based on aircraft 
attitude, detection and control of multiple failures, increasing the number of sensor sources, and 
updating the simulation. 
As mentioned earlier, using dynamically changing R and Q matrices as a function of a 
commanded maneuver will allow for better detection during maneuvering flight.  Research into 
an adaptive Q matrix for use within an MMAE algorithm, in order to enhance the 
distinguishability of assumed parameter values (hypothesized failure status and ε values) has been 
completed previously in both the continuous-time case and then in the discrete-time case [18,19, 
29].  An adaptive Q and R matrix has not yet been applied to this case but may result in enhanced 
failure detection capabilities and fewer false alarms during maneuvering flight. 
A second area that may be expanded is the model scheduling based on aircraft attitude.  
As the aircraft changes attitude, the linear elemental filters based on the trimmed, straight-and-
level flight condition become inaccurate, degrading the detection capability.  Filters based on the 
actual aircraft attitude using a lookup table for filters based on high bank and pitch angles, and 
linear interpolation between these and the straight-and-level flight condition, would enhance the 
detection and control characteristics of the MMAE/FS/CR. 
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A natural next area of investigation is to allow the MMAE/FS/CR to detect multiple 
failures and attempt to provide the proper control.  In the current state of the software, the 
detection and control redistribution can only handle one sensor or actuator failure.  The “Level 2” 
banks of filters that are used to handle dual failures have not been completely defined in the 
software as yet but the existing architecture can conceptually handle this simulation [7].  This will 
also bring up the limitation of the CR to handle dual actuator failures.  The amount of control 
authority may not be able to handle a dual actuator failure.  
The fourth area is the addition of more sensors to enhance the failure detection and 
estimation.  This research uses the bare minimum sensors to provide the observability to detect 
failures and to provide adequate sensor information to the flight control system given a sensor 
failure.  Other sensors can be added, such as inertial navigation sensors (accurate pitch, roll, and 
yaw angles) and actuator position sensors.  This will greatly enhance the capability of the 
MMAE/FS/CR to detect partial and complete actuator failures and complete sensor failures.  This 
will also enhance the MMAE/FS/CR capability to create an estimated sensor output to the flight 
control system if one of the sensors has actually failed.  This will also improve the MMAE/FS 
capability to provide a reliable and accurate estimate of effectiveness to the CR, which will then 
result in better CR performance during partial actuator failures. 
The final area of improvement is the expansion of the software to a new aircraft such as 
UAVs, tailless aircraft, or other aircraft in general.  The current simulation is limited to an old 
SUN computer system.  New simulation tools based on current computer technology representing 
modern aircraft (with different geometries, additional actuation surfaces, more and better sensors) 
and their associated flight control systems should be used in order to move the MMAE/FS/CR 
closer to actual aircraft implementation.  The use of modern computers and technology will also 
make the simulation more convenient although the current VISTA F-16 simulation ‘does the job’. 
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6.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter provides the reader with the conclusions for the failure detection and control 
redistribution performance in this research effort.  This chapter also provided discussions on 
possible improvements to the MMAE/FS/CR.  A discussion of the application of MMAE/FS/CR 
onto UAVs is also presented.  Finally, this chapter presented the possible areas of exploitation in 
order to move this research closer to actual implementation. 
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Appendix A: VISTA F-16 SRF General Information 
 
A.1 Variable-stability In-flight Simulation Test Aircraft (VISTA) 
 
The Variable-stability In-flight Simulation Test Aircraft (VISTA) is a modified F-16D 
aircraft used to simulate various flight control designs.  The aircraft is currently used as a test 
aircraft at Edwards Air Force Base, California.  The VISTA F-16 flight control system is 
composed of the original Block 40 Flight Control System (FCS) and the Variable Stability system 
(VSS) that allows the VISTA F-16 to act like other aircraft with respect to their control 
performance and characteristics.  This can be accomplished with the F-16 aircraft since the FCS 
is based on the Fly-By-Wire design, meaning there is no physical contact between the pilot’s 
flight controls and the flight control actuators. 
Another advantage to the VISTA F-16 aircraft is the capability to test various flight 
control systems and be able to switch back to the proven Block 40 FCS if a problem is discovered 
with the FCS under test.  This ensures the safety of the pilot and crew while accomplishing tests 
on new flight control designs.  The VSS of the VISTA F-16 can also duplicate flight control 
failures in order to test the FCS capability of controlling a damaged aircraft. 
These advantages make the VISTA F-16 a uniquely useful test aircraft for the initial 
implementation of the Multiple Model Adaptive Estimator with Filter Spawning and with Control 
Redistribution (MMAE/FS/CR).  The disadvantage of using the VISTA F-16 is the single rudder 
surface.  During a rudder failure, there is not enough control authority in the other flight controls 
to command a yaw to make up for the failed rudder.  The MMAE/FS/CR works best when there 
is enough redundancy in all flight control surfaces to allow the failure in one flight control surface 
and still maintain control over the aircraft. 
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A.2 Flight Control System 
 
This section presents a discussion of the Flight Control System (FCS) of the VISTA F-16 
aircraft with and without the proposed implementation of the MMAE/FS/CR.  The actual aircraft 
FCS contains various sensors and hardware linked together using the MIL-STD-1553B avionics 
databus.  The Block 40 FCS then uses the information collected from the sensors and pilot 
commands entered through the flight control stick and rudder pedals to determine the proper 
flight control actuator commands required to accomplish the desired maneuver.  These commands 
are then electronically sent to hydraulic actuators that move the flight control surfaces.  The VSS 
is an addition to the original F-16D aircraft that can adjust the electronic signals going to the 
actuators in order to duplicate various types of control systems.  MMAE/FS/CR does not require 
the use of the VSS so it will not be discussed in this section. 
The illustration below represents the original Block 40 FCS on an F-16D aircraft.  This 








Figure 77: Original F-16D Flight Control System 
 
In order to apply the MMAE/FS/CR, several changes had to be made to the original FCS.  
The first change is the insertion of MMAE/FS algorithm between the sensors and the Block 40 
Pilot 
Commands 




FCS.  This allows the MMAE/FS access to the sensor information to update the elemental filters 
within the MMAE/FS.  The MMAE/FS then produces an estimate of the sensor information (i.e., 
a best reconstruction of sensor measurements as if there were no sensor failures), which is passed 
on to the Block 40 FCS.  The next change to the original FCS is the insertion of the CR algorithm 
after the Block 40 FCS and before the flight control actuators.  This allows the CR algorithm to 
redistribute the original Block 40 FCS commands based on the declared failure.  The MMAE/FS 
is connected to the CR to provide the actuator failure declaration, as well as the estimate of 
actuator effectiveness (ε).  A loop from the original Block 40 FCS outputs back to the input of the 
FCS had to be added to allow the Block 40 FCS to believe that its commands are being 
implemented even though a flight control failure may occur and the CR is redistributing the 






















The advantage of MMAE/FS/CR is that it uses all of the original systems and does not 
require major changes in the current avionics system.  The sensor data is intercepted by the 
MMAE/FS and then the estimates are sent to the original Block 40 FCS.  The Block 40 FCS then 
sends the flight control actuator commands that the CR intercepts.  The CR then sends the 
redistributed flight control commands to the flight control actuators. 
A.3 VISTA F-16 Simulation Rapid-prototyping Facility 
 
This section describes the VISTA F-16 Simulation Rapid-prototyping Facility (SRF) 
simulation tool and its operation with the MMAE/FS/CR implemented.  The SRF is a nonlinear, 
six-degree-of-freedom simulation of the VISTA F-16 aircraft.  The simulation contains added 
Dryden Wind Tunnel noise and employs 4th order actuator models.  Calspan and General 
Dynamics developed the simulation [11].  The Air Vehicles Laboratory at Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base originally used the SRF simulation.  The simulation tool is written in the Fortran 77 
language and is limited to operation on an older Sun Operating System.  Efforts are underway to 
transport the simulation software to a more modern operating system but the original source code 
is required for some of the called libraries.  Unfortunately, Calspan and General Dynamics are not 
maintaining the simulation code anymore, so the source code may be completely lost, limiting the 
simulation to run only on the Sun Operating System. 
The simulation is set up using a series of subroutines, each representing the operation of a 
particular section of the VISTA F-16 FCS.  The algorithm for the simulation is shown in 
Figure79.  The boxes show the functions with the actual subroutine name that is related to that 
function.  The labels outside the boxes show the variable latch names that carry the data from one 



















Figure 79: Original VISTA F-16 SRF Algorithm 
 
These are the primary subroutines and their functions.  The FCSLATCH variables are 
used to transfer the commands from the Block 40 FCS to the actuators.  The actuator models are 
applied and the actuator commands are saved to the ATRLATCH variables.  The aircraft 
dynamics subroutines use the ATRLATCH variables to propagate the aircraft states forward in 
time.  The states are then stored in the STATELAT variables.  The pilot commands are stored in 
the INPLATCH variables to go to the Block 40 FCS.  The entire simulation is saved in the file 
named vista.F and the simulation loop above is the subroutine simulate.F.  The implementation of 








































Figure 80: VISTA F-16 SRF with MMAE/FS/CR Implementation 
 
The FLTR0 and ε variables are the actuator failure declaration and the estimate of 
effectiveness from the MMAE/FS.  The MLTLATCH are the control variables that complete the 
FCS loop. 
The simulation requires a parameter file in order to run the simulation.  This parameter 



























name a few) and the pilot commands for the simulation.  The Transportable Applications 
Executive (TAE) software creates the parameter file.  The following table shows the standard 
settings for variables used in this research effort.  All the other parameter values within the TAE 
setup menus can remain at the nominal values.  At anytime, the user can type HELP and the name 
of the variable to get information on the variable as well as options where applicable. 
TAE Menu Variable 
 
Description Nominal Value 
1 – Standard Parameters stoptime 
 
Simulation Duration (seconds) 5.0 
 altitude 
 
Initial Altitude (ft) 10000 
 mach 
 
Initial Airspeed (Mach) 0.7 
 thrcntrl Throttle Control Type (Constant, 
Manual, Auto) 
“auto” 
 commands(n) Pilot Commands (pstep, rstep, 
pdoublet, rdoublet) 
(null value) 
 cmdmagn(n) Magnitude of Pilot Commands 
(pounds) 
(null value) 
 cmdtime(n) Start Time for Each Pilot 
Command (seconds) 
(null value) 
 cmddur(n) Duration of Each Command 
(seconds) 
(null value) 
 mxfile Name of MATRIXx File for 
Linear Model Generation 
(null value) 
3 – Wind Parameters seed Seed for Random Number 
Generation 
1987 
Table 4: TAE Menu Options 
 
The altitude and Mach variables are used to set the initial simulation altitude and 
airspeed.  Since linear models are used for this research effort, the thrcntrl variable should be set 
to “constant”, meaning the throttle control is not changed through the simulation.  A throttle 
control setting of “auto” allows the simulation to adjust the throttle to maintain the trim airspeed 
and a setting of “manual” allows the throttle to be manually adjusted through the commands(n) 
variable.  The commands(n) variable is used to insert up to five pilot commanded maneuvers into 
the simulation.  The commands are pitch and roll step (pstep and rstep) and pitch and roll 
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doublets (pdoublet and rdoublet).  Other pilot commands are available and can be accessed 
through the HELP menu.  The cmdmagn(n) variable sets the magnitude of the commanded 
maneuver in pounds of force.  The stick force limits are shown in the HELP menu.  The 
cmdtime(n) variable is the commanded maneuver start time and the cmddur(n) is the duration of 
the commanded maneuver.  Both of these variables are in seconds. 
The mxfile variable is used to generate the MATRIXx file for use in generating the linear 
filters based on the failure hypotheses.  The MATRIXx file should be saved as srfdat.m.  This file 
contains the linear model parameter values, including all the time conditions, based on the initial 
airspeed and altitude settings above.  The VISTA simulation must be run from the TAE software 
in order to generate the srfdat.m file.  The final setting in the TAE software relevant to this 
research is the seed variable.  The seed variable is used in the zero-order Dryden noise applied to 
the simulation.  The turbulence routines used by the original VISTA software are not used.  The 
updated Dryden noise can be removed through a setting in the FLAGS.DAT file.  The seed 
variable defines which random sequence to use in the simulation.  This also allows random 
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